Chapter 1: The Realist Transformation of Gulf Oil States
Saudi Arabia: Irreversible Shift to Economic Pragmatism
Saudi Arabia’s response reflects the fundamental change in strategic thinking the country has experienced over the past five years. The Foreign Ministry’s statement “condemning and denouncing the violation of the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran” appears superficially supportive of Iran, but is extremely calculated diplomatic language. Importantly, this condemnation carefully avoids naming “America” in its criticism. By simultaneously emphasising the “need for restraint and de-escalation,” it effectively takes the form of a request to America.
The background to this linguistic strategy lies in the serious trauma inflicted by the September 2019 Aramco attack. That attack temporarily cost Saudi Arabia half its oil production and sent serious shockwaves through global oil markets. This incident made Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman acutely aware of the costs of military confrontation and prompted his decision to shift toward realist policies prioritising regional stability. The diplomatic restoration with Iran mediated by China in March 2023 was symbolic of this strategic transformation.
The Saudi authorities’ immediate announcement through the nuclear regulatory authorities that there were “no signs of radiation contamination in the Gulf region” demonstrates serious concerns about domestic security.
For Saudi Arabia, with its ambitious Vision 2030 economic reform plan, regional military destabilisation poses a fatal threat. Mega-projects, including NEOM, presuppose continued foreign investment inflows, and prolonged regional warfare would fundamentally alter investor risk perceptions. Saudi Arabia’s “deep concern” expression stems from recognising this economic vulnerability. The country now prioritises the pragmatic goal of national transformation through economic development over its ideological role as “leader of the Sunni world.”
UAE: Complex Security Calculations as a Nuclear-Capable Nation
The UAE’s response reflects complex security calculations arising from its unique position as the Middle East’s only nuclear energy-possessing state. The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) issued a technical assessment within hours of the attack, stating “no impact on UAE from American attack,” demonstrating serious concerns about nuclear security for a country with a $32 billion Barakah nuclear power project. This immediate response indicates the UAE’s strong recognition of the need to dispel domestic and international doubts about nuclear plant safety.
When the Foreign Ministry demanded “immediate de-escalation to prevent the region from falling into a new level of instability,” the expression “new level” implies that the current situation is already in dangerous waters. Since 2019, the UAE has positioned regional stabilisation as its top priority. It has built a multilateral security strategy through improved relations with Iran, tension reduction with Turkey, and the Abraham Accords with Israel. However, this crisis has fundamentally shaken this strategic balance.
The economic sector’s reaction also clearly demonstrates the country’s pragmatic thinking. Five airlines – Emirates, Etihad Airways, flydubai, Wizz Air Abu Dhabi, and Air Arabia – decided to continue suspending regional air routes, prioritising safety over economic losses. As the UAE has established itself as the Middle East’s largest aviation hub, aviation industry decisions directly impact national strategy.
This shows that the UAE government’s normalisation policies do not necessarily enjoy popular support. This division of public opinion explains the UAE’s difficulty in taking a clear position in this crisis. While advocating economic pragmatism, the country faces limitations in consistent strategic deployment due to domestic political constraints.
Qatar’s Strategic Dilemma and Sophisticated Language Manipulation
Qatar’s response demonstrates sophisticated management of the country’s fundamental strategic contradictions. Most notable is the dramatic change in diplomatic language within 24 hours. During the June 13 Israeli attack, it identified the subject (Israel) as a “clear violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security.” Still, during the June 22 American attack, it completely removed the subject, stating it “regrets the deterioration of the situation due to attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.” This shift in linguistic strategy proves that Qatar applies fundamentally different diplomatic standards between America and Iran.
Behind this contradictory response lie multiple strategic constraints Qatar faces. First, Al Udeid Base houses the largest U.S. military command in the Middle East (CENTCOM Forward Command), and Qatar’s security depends entirely on American military protection. Second, Qatar has functioned as the only reliable mediator between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza war, and this role forms the core of the country’s international standing. Third, the country’s energy strategy, accounting for 20% of global LNG supply, presupposes regional stability.
Even more serious is the structural vulnerability of Strait of Hormuz dependence. Qatar’s LNG tankers depend entirely on passage through this strait for supply to European and East Asian customers. There are serious concerns about the possibility of the Iranian closure of the Strait.
The blow to Qatar’s mediation diplomacy cannot be overlooked. Since October 2023, the country has gained international recognition as the only effective liaison between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza war. However, America’s direct military participation has raised doubts about Qatar’s position as a “neutral mediator.” For the Al Thani royal family, this loss of diplomatic prestige means the erosion of strategic assets that have maintained their position as an important regional player despite being a small state.
Oman’s Diplomatic Humiliation and the Collapse of a 40-Year Strategy
Oman’s response clearly demonstrates the seriousness of the diplomatic humiliation the country experienced. The Foreign Ministry “expressed deep concern, condemnation, and denunciation of escalation by direct American airstrikes” and used the expression “serious violation of international law,” which was the strongest criticism among Gulf states. This strong tone reflects not merely policy disagreement but anger at the denial of the country’s national strategy’s foundations.
The country was scheduled to host the sixth U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Muscat on June 15 and had maintained its mediator status even during the Biden-to-Trump administration transition. However, America’s unilateral military action completely nullified these diplomatic efforts.
Oman’s mediation diplomacy has been the core of its national strategy for 40 years. In the secret negotiations of the 1980s Iran-Contra affair, the foundational stages of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks from 2013, the process leading to the 2015 nuclear agreement, and the resumption of talks from 2021, Oman has consistently served as the only reliable bridge between the two countries. This strategic value was precisely why Oman maintained an important position in the region despite being inferior to other Gulf states in terms of oil reserves and military power.
This situation also represents a national identity crisis for Sultan Haitham’s government. Oman has traditionally maintained a neutral position transcending sectarian conflicts, building a unique diplomatic position by balancing good relations with Iran and strategic cooperation with America. However, America’s military intervention has made this “strategic ambiguity” no longer sustainable. Oman is now forced to clearly choose one side, which could mean the end of the country’s diplomatic autonomy.
Geographic factors cannot be ignored. Oman controls the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz and is positioned at the strategic chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. Amid Iranian hints at strait closure, maintaining Oman’s neutral position is extremely important for international maritime traffic security. However, this crisis has raised serious doubts about whether Oman can maintain true neutrality.
This fact-based analysis clearly demonstrates each country’s complex strategic calculations and the predominance of realist judgments transcending sectarian politics. It confirms that all countries are taking rational actions, prioritising national survival and development over sectarian identity.
Chapter 2: Strategic Adaptation and Limitations of Regional Powers
Turkey: Between Regional Power Ambitions and Reality
Turkey’s response exposes the fundamental limitations of the “neo-Ottoman” regional strategy that the Erdogan government has pursued for the past 20 years. The Foreign Ministry’s warning of “risks of regional conflict expanding to a global level” reflects concern and serious fear of Turkey being drawn into regional destabilisation.
President Erdogan’s personal humiliation is particularly serious. On June 16, while attending the G7 summit in Canada, he proposed hosting a U.S.-Iran high-level meeting in Istanbul the next day with Trump and secured promises to send Vice President Vance and Middle East Envoy Witkoff. Even more unusually, Trump showed a willingness to participate in direct talks with President Pezeshkian. This active mediation work represented Erdogan’s pride as a regional power and an excellent opportunity to demonstrate Turkey’s geopolitical importance to the international community.
However, America’s unilateral military action completely frustrated this diplomatic ambition. For Turkey, whose relations with the West deteriorated after the 2016 coup attempt, successful U.S.-Iran mediation would have meant recovery of international standing. Erdogan has long positioned Turkey as a bridge between East and West, pursuing “strategic autonomy” that maintains relationships with Russia, Iran, and China while remaining a NATO member. The failure of this mediation effort demonstrates the limitations of this strategy itself.
The geographic reality Turkey faces cannot be ignored. The country shares a 560-kilometre border with Iran, opposes the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, remains wary of Kurdish forces in Iraq, and confronts Greece and Egypt in the Mediterranean. Deteriorating relations with Iran would further aggravate the situation of being surrounded by enemies on four sides. Turkey has advocated “neo-Ottomanism” and aimed for regional hegemony, but actually faces the danger of falling from regional power status to being a medium-sized state tossed about between great power competition.
Erdogan’s silence indicates his inability to find countermeasures to this complex situation. This betrayal demands a fundamental reconsideration of strategic miscalculations in Turkish diplomacy, which has emphasised personal relations with Trump. While pursuing regional influence expansion amid domestic problems of economic crisis, currency depreciation, and high inflation, this situation has clarified the approach’s strategic costs and limitations.
Chapter 3: Survival Strategies of Third-Tier Vulnerable States: Institutionalisation of Partial Sovereignty Abandonment and Great Power Dependence
Iraq: Institutionalisation of Triple Dependency Structure and Limits of State Governance
Iraq’s response demonstrates the typical “failed states” pattern in the contemporary Middle East. While Prime Minister Sudani stated that “military escalation is a serious threat to Middle East peace,” leaders of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) openly threatened attacks on American military bases, exposing the reality that the Iraqi government cannot control armed groups within its territory. This division represents not merely political conflict but loss of basic state functions.
More serious is that Iraq is forced into simultaneous dependence on three different great powers. It receives military and security support from America, energy supply and religious influence from Iran, and “Belt and Road” investment from China. This triple dependency structure extremely complicates Iraq’s policy decisions. The reality of depending on Iranian natural gas for 33% of the electricity supply means Iraq cannot choose confrontation with Iran. Simultaneously, the reality that American military support is indispensable for ISIS countermeasures and domestic security makes severing relations with America impossible.
The complexity of the coalition government between the Coordination Framework (CF) and the State Administration Coalition (SAC) is also a mechanism for politically managing this triple dependency. Prime Minister Sudani superficially criticises America while restraining PMF’s radical actions, seeking to maintain relations with all three great powers. This is not a coherent policy as a sovereign state, but opportunistic balance diplomacy for survival.
The June 20 airspace violation incident by 50 Israeli fighter jets decisively proved that Iraq’s sovereignty has already been hollowed out. Despite the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement clearly stating “prohibition of using Iraqi territory for attacks on other countries,” the Iraqi government could neither prevent this violation nor make effective post-facto protests. This indicates that while Iraq is legally independent, it must substantively accept being used as a stage for great power competition.
Lebanon: Survival Instincts of a State on the Brink of Collapse
President Aoun’s statement that “we cannot pay the price of more war” succinctly expresses the desperate situation of a country on the verge of state collapse. Amid economic collapse, including an 80% GDP reduction since 2019, over 90% currency devaluation, and chronic power supply shortages, new warfare would mean the complete disappearance of the Lebanese state. The presidential statement’s expression “Lebanon has continued to pay the price of regional wars. This is against national interests” reflects collective trauma from the 1975-1990 civil war and the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.
Lebanon’s uniqueness lies in its sectarian power-sharing system, in which the non-state actor Hezbollah performs most state functions. Hezbollah provides much of the military power, social security, electricity supply, and medical services, substantially functioning as a “state within a state.” However, Hezbollah’s cautious response in this crisis indicates that past military losses have significantly weakened the organisation itself.
Hezbollah’s condemnation of “savage and treacherous attacks” while refraining from concrete retaliatory action suggests it has lost the capability to lead regional warfare. Paradoxically, this serves as a stabilising factor for the Lebanese state. Hezbollah’s military restraint has allowed Lebanon to avoid becoming a direct battlefield in this crisis.
However, Lebanon’s fundamental problem is that this fragile equilibrium depends entirely on external factors. Hezbollah’s military actions, Israeli attack decisions, American policy changes, and Iranian strategic decisions all affect Lebanon’s survival. The country has completely lost the ability to determine its own fate and has fallen into a passive existence at the mercy of regional power policy changes.
Syria: New Regime’s Attempt at Strategic Transformation
The new Syrian regime, led by HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), avoiding official statements on this crisis, reflects the country’s fundamental strategic transformation. Post-Assad Syria has positioned the elimination of Iranian influence and improved relations with the West as top priorities, and involvement in this crisis could negatively impact the new regime’s international recognition strategy.
The new regime’s continued work to cut off weapons corridors to Iran and Hezbollah indicates Syria’s clear departure from the “axis of resistance”. It attempts to integrate into a new regional order. This represents not merely a regime change but a fundamental alteration of Syria’s geopolitical identity. The shift from Iran-Russia dependence under Assad to national reconstruction through Western recognition is a strategic gamble for Syria’s survival.
However, the challenge for Syria’s new regime lies in the difficulty of legitimising this strategic transformation domestically and internationally. Domestically, prolonged civil war has destroyed social infrastructure and deepened sectarian and tribal conflicts. Internationally, HTS’s past terrorist organisation designation will require time for international recognition. While the new regime prioritised improved Western relations through non-intervention in this crisis, this could create new tensions with domestic anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments.
Syria’s silence also means the country has accepted its fall from an important regional actor to a peripheral existence. While Syria once played a central role in regional politics as the “heart of the Arab world,” the new regime has abandoned regional ambitions, prioritising national reconstruction. This is a realistic judgment but simultaneously indicates a significant decline in Syria’s geopolitical value.
Jordan: “Double Game” for Monarchical Survival
King Abdullah II’s “double game” is extremely sophisticatedly designed as a survival strategy for the monarchy. While militarily intercepting Iranian missiles and effectively supporting Israel, politically expressing “concerns about regional conflicts” to suppress backlash from domestic Palestinian-origin residents (about 60% of the population). This contradictory behaviour responds to the dual legitimacy crisis the royal family faces.
The first crisis is the necessity of maintaining the Western alliance. Jordan depends decisively on American military and economic support, and deteriorating Western relations would threaten the monarchy’s survival. The second crisis is maintaining domestic political legitimacy. With Palestinian-origin residents forming a majority, overt Israeli support risks royal backlash and domestic instability.
The king’s convening of emergency meetings with government and security agency heads and instruction to formulate a “continental plan” was necessary to seek concrete countermeasures for monarchical survival within these dual constraints. Jordan’s geographic position inevitably involves the country in conflict as a transit point for Iranian missiles and Israeli retaliatory attacks. The royal family has chosen tactics to weather the crisis with minimal damage, premised on this geographic destiny.
Importantly, Jordan’s “double game” is not mere opportunism but a rational strategy for small state survival in great power competition. The royal family prioritises long-term monarchical survival and accepts all necessary contradictions for this purpose. This strategy’s success depends on the royal family’s adaptive capacity to domestic and international situational changes.
Common Pattern of Vulnerable State Groups: Gradual Sovereignty Abandonment
Analysis of these four countries reveals a common pattern of “gradual sovereignty abandonment.” While legally independent states, they have substantially lost the ability to determine their own fate and become passive existences at the mercy of great power policy changes. Iraq’s triple dependency, Lebanon’s non-state actor control, Syria’s external recognition dependency, and Jordan’s contradictory dual policy all represent strategies sacrificing coherence as sovereign states for survival.
This phenomenon indicates transformation of the sovereign state system since the Westphalian system. These countries formally possess sovereignty under international law as UN members, but substantially function as stages for great power competition. Their policy choices are not autonomous national will but adaptive responses to external constraints.
Importantly, this sovereignty abandonment is becoming institutionalised as a structural reality rather than a temporary crisis response. All countries prioritise survival through status quo maintenance over sovereignty recovery, and this choice constrains long-term national development possibilities. In the new Middle Eastern order, these vulnerable states are positioned not as independent actors but as dependent variables of great power politics.
Chapter 4: New Stage of Great Power Competition and Strategic Defeat
China: Decisive Setback of “Belt and Road” Strategy
China’s response signifies a decisive setback to the Middle East strategy that the Xi Jinping government has promoted for the past decade. The Foreign Ministry’s expressions “serious violation of UN Charter and international law” and “further deterioration of Middle East tensions” show China’s intention to differentiate from America’s unilateral actionism by emphasising respect for international law. However, more importantly, this criticism hints at the collapse of China’s entire Middle East strategy.
Since announcing the “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2013, China has positioned the Middle East as a cornerstone of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and sought influence expansion through economic cooperation. The core of this strategy lay in “sectarian neutrality.” As a communist state, China lacked religious entanglements and could maximise advantages in equidistant diplomacy with both Sunni and Shia sides. The 2021 Iran-China 25-year agreement, a comprehensive investment agreement with Saudi Arabia, and the “Digital Silk Road” construction in the UAE showed China using economic power to incorporate Middle Eastern countries into its sphere of influence.
China’s mediation of Saudi-Iran reconciliation in March 2023 was the peak of this strategy. Beijing seemed to have proven the effectiveness of the “Chinese model” that economic cooperation could overcome sectarian conflicts. Chairman Xi highly valued this diplomatic victory and boasted that China could contribute to regional peace as a “responsible great power.” Within the Chinese Communist Party, optimistic assessments prevailed that pathways to establishing hegemonic position in the Middle East where American influence was declining had become visible.
However, American military intervention rendered this diplomatic victory meaningless overnight. China’s “peace through economic power” principle ultimately succumbed to American military power. More seriously, Middle Eastern geopolitical destabilisation directly hits China’s energy security. China depends on the Middle East for about 45% of its oil imports, and regional military tensions threaten China’s economic growth strategy itself.
China’s strategic miscalculation lay in economic determinism. Beijing approached the Middle East on the premise that economic interdependence would neutralise political conflicts, but this premise had fundamental flaws. China positioned itself as a neutral arbitrator, transcending sectarian conflicts, but was actually clearly incorporated into the anti-American, anti-Israeli camp through a strategic partnership with Iran. Indirect support for the “axis of resistance” and cooperation in Iranian sanctions evasion showed China’s “neutrality” was a mere disguise.
This situation forces China to again depend on American-led security systems for a stable Middle Eastern energy supply, which represents a serious retreat for China’s strategic autonomy. For China, seeking to balance domestic demand expansion and opening up while reducing dependence on America through a “dual circulation” strategy, the Middle East policy failure forces reconsideration of its overall national strategy.
Russia: Complete Collapse of “Greater Eurasia” Concept
Russia’s response indicates complete collapse of the “Greater Eurasia” concept promoted by the Putin government. Medvedev’s statement that “multiple countries are ready to provide Iran with nuclear weapons” sounds tough, but actually reflects Russia’s desperate situation. Having severely depleted military power in the Ukraine war, Russia has lost the capability to provide substantial military support to Iran. Hinting at nuclear proliferation threats is merely one of the few remaining diplomatic cards for Russia.
Since the 2014 Crimea annexation, the Putin government has deepened three-nation cooperation with China and Iran under the “Greater Eurasia” concept. The core of this strategy lay in uniting the “non-Western world” against the Western-led international order. Military intervention in the Syrian civil war, strategic partnership with Iran, and “unlimited friendship” with China were all understood in this context. Russia positioned itself as a “civilisational state” and sought to present a unique worldview opposing Western values.
However, the prolonged Ukraine war has forced a fundamental reconsideration of this strategy. Russian military power has been consumed beyond expectations, and economic sanctions have deepened international isolation. More importantly, influential foundations in the Middle East are rapidly collapsing. The collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, the dismantling of Iran’s “axis of resistance,” and this attack on Iranian nuclear facilities show Russia losing strategic value in the Middle East.
Russia’s Middle East strategy was based on fundamentally different motivations from China’s. While China aimed at economic penetration through regional stability, Russia sought to disperse America’s strategic attention through regional destabilisation. Syrian intervention, military cooperation with Iran, and nuclear proliferation threats all intended to compensate for disadvantages in Ukraine and Europe. For Russia, Middle Eastern peace was not beneficial; rather, it was threatening.
However, American participation in this conflict completely collapsed Russia’s “chaos export” strategy. American military re-engagement in the Middle East rapidly diminishes Russian influence. More seriously, weakening of Iran, an important partner, has made Russia’s entire Middle East strategy lose its raison d’être. Medvedev’s nuclear proliferation threats are merely a final resistance reflecting this strategic desperation.
Russian-Iranian cooperation was based on temporary interest convergence but also contained fundamental conflict factors. Russia desires continued Middle Eastern chaos while Iran seeks regional hegemony through the completion of nuclear development. This American attack could surface this latent conflict. If Iran becomes disappointed with Russia’s support capabilities, bilateral relations could face fundamental reconsideration.
EU: Strategic Powerlessness and Atlantic Alliance Hollowing
The European Union’s response decisively exposes its strategic powerlessness and serious internal divisions. Commission President von der Leyen’s statement that “the negotiating table is the only solution” and Foreign Minister Kallas’s decision to “convene an emergency EU foreign ministers meeting” both lack concrete response measures to the situation. The EU has fallen into a situation where it has no choice but to follow American decisions in Middle East policy, indicating a serious contradiction with European integration ideals advocating “strategic autonomy.”
More serious is the decisive surfacing of European internal divisions. British Prime Minister Starmer expressed unconditional American support, stating that it was “necessary to prevent Iranian nuclear development.” This reflects the reality of the post-Brexit “Global Britain” strategy. Severed from continental European economic integration by EU departure, Britain seeks to maintain international influence through a “special relationship” with America. This support statement is a consequence of this strategic choice.
French Foreign Minister Barrot emphasised “no involvement or participation in attack planning” and expressed “deep concern” about maintaining distance. This reflects France’s tradition of independent diplomacy but also includes pragmatic calculations about managing relations with America. President Macron has long advocated “strategic autonomy” and taken critical positions toward American unilateral factionalism. However, France’s inability to overturn American decisions became clear in an actual crisis.
German Chancellor Merz convened an emergency security cabinet meeting and demanded “immediate US-Iran negotiations,” showing prioritisation of diplomatic solutions. This reflects Germany’s traditional emphasis on economics and multilateral cooperation. However, Germany also has limited capability to present concrete diplomatic alternatives and must ultimately accept American fait accompli.
This division decisively shows the EU cannot take unified positions on international crises. The European integration ideal of “ever closer union” has lost substantial meaning in foreign policy and security fields. The reality of each country acting based on individual national interests proves that the EU’s “strategic autonomy” is merely empty sloganeering.
Even more serious is the hollowing of the Atlantic alliance itself. America’s execution of important military action without prior consultation clarified the malfunction of NATO coordination mechanisms. This fundamentally shakes Western alliance foundations built since the Cold War. European countries are placed in subordinate positions without effective control measures against American unilateralism, indicating structural changes in the international order.
Chapter 5: Establishment of New Middle Eastern Order and Historical Significance
End of Sectarian Politics and Rise of Realist Calculations
Detailed analysis of each country’s responses reveals the historical fact that sectarian identity, which has regulated Middle Eastern politics for 1,400 years, has ceased functioning as a substantial policy-determining factor. Saudi Arabia, supposedly the Sunni leader, defends Shia Iran’s sovereignty. At the same time, Egypt, also Sunni, expresses “solidarity” with Iran, while Iraq, a Shia-majority country, prioritises practical governance needs over sectarian solidarity. This phenomenon shows that while sectarian identity remains a tool for political mobilisation, it has fallen to a secondary factor in actual foreign policy.
At the root of this change lies the transformation in the nature of existential threats each country faces. No longer military threats from sectarian enemies, but secular risks such as hindered economic development, energy security collapse, and loss of state governance capacity have become each country’s top priorities. Each country’s national strategies—Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, UAE’s economic diversification strategy, Qatar’s LNG-dependent economy, Oman’s mediation diplomacy—are all constructed based on economic pragmatism rather than sectarian values.
Re-importance of Geographic Factors and New Dividing Axes
Parallel to the decline of sectarian politics, geographic factors have regained decisive importance. Oman’s Strait of Hormuz control, Egypt’s Suez Canal management, Turkey’s Bosphorus Strait and border with Iran, Qatar’s geographic isolation and LNG transport route dependence, UAE’s nuclear plant location and geographic exposure to the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s geopolitical vulnerability surrounded by enemies on four sides—these physical realities directly regulate each country’s policy choices.
This revival of geographic determinism signifies a return to 19th-century classical geopolitics. Physical elements like straits, canals, borders, and resources have regained prominence as major variables in international politics over conceptual elements like sect and ideology. This simultaneously means the end of paradigms like “values diplomacy” and “clash of civilisations” that dominated for 30 years after the Cold War’s end.
Clarification of Hierarchization by State Capacity
Analysis of each country’s response patterns reveals the emergence of new hierarchical structures based on state capacity, replacing sectarian classification. First-tier high-income oil states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) prioritise economic pragmatism and pursue a balance between maintaining American relations and ensuring regional stability. Second-tier middle-income regional powers (Egypt, Turkey) attempt to maintain limited autonomy but are ultimately forced to adapt to the American-led order. Third-tier vulnerable states (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan) prioritise survival strategies and accept being used as stages for great power competition.
This hierarchisation closely relates to each country’s external dependence levels. Countries hosting American military bases prioritise relationship maintenance, those seeking multiple dependencies pursue balance diplomacy among multiple great powers, and those aspiring to independent courses are ultimately forced into action within constrained options. Importantly, this hierarchy completely transcends sectarian identity.
New Stage of Great Power Competition: Settlement Between Economic and Military Power
China and Russia’s strategic defeats mark an important turning point in 21st-century great power competition. Both China’s principle of “peace through economic power” and Russia’s “chaos export” strategy succumbed to American military power. This signifies the collapse of optimistic premises that economic interdependence would neutralise military conflict in the globalisation era.
China’s “Belt and Road” strategy sought to present a new hegemonic model that was not dependent on military power through influence expansion via economic cooperation. However, a decisive defeat in the Middle East proved that military power ultimately overwhelms economic power. Russia’s regional destabilisation strategy was also neutralised by American direct military intervention. This result shows the revival of 19th-century military power-centred international politics.
Europe’s Strategic Marginalisation and Atlantic Alliance Transformation
The EU’s powerless response indicates that Europe has fallen to peripheral existence in 21st-century geopolitical competition. While advocating “strategic autonomy,” Europe lacks the capability to influence American decisions in actual international crises and is no longer an independent geopolitical actor. France, Germany, and Britain’s divided responses expose the limits of European integration.
More serious is the character change of the Atlantic alliance itself. The transformation from Cold War-era equal partnership to subordinate relations in which Europe follows American unilateral decisions has become clear. This signifies a fundamental change in the Western world’s internal structure.
Characteristics of New Middle Eastern Order: Post-Sectarian Realism
The new Middle Eastern order established on June 21, 2025, has the following characteristics. First is the political powerlessness of sectarian identity. Second, a new hierarchisation is based on geographic factors and state capacity. Third, dominance of realist calculations prioritising economic pragmatism. Fourth, reconfirmation of the American military power’s overwhelming superiority. Fifth, strategic retreat of revisionist powers like China and Russia.
In this new order, each country pursues secular goals like energy security, economic development, and regime maintenance rather than sectarian solidarity or civilisational values. This may represent the modernisation of Middle Eastern politics, but simultaneously, it means the emergence of a more cold-blooded and fragmented international environment that has lost its foundations for common values or regional integration.
Historical Significance: Structural Transformation Since 1979
Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Middle East has been characterised by sectarian conflicts. The emergence of a Shia revolutionary regime made the Sunni-Shia conflict the main axis of geopolitical competition, and this structure has regulated the regional order for over 40 years. However, American participation decisively ended this historical structure on June 21, 2025.
The newly emerging order is based on realist calculations transcending sectarianism. Each country acts based on objective factors like state capacity, economic development level, geographic position, and external dependence rather than sectarian identity. This represents a fundamental character change in Middle Eastern politics and will regulate the region’s security environment for decades to come.
This change forces Middle Eastern countries to adapt to new realities. They can no longer depend on sectarian solidarity or ideological unity; each country must construct survival strategies based on cold-blooded national interest calculations. While this aligns with American geopolitical interests in the short term, it harbours possibilities for unpredictable new conflict axes emerging in the long term.
Conclusion: America’s Strategic Decision and Geopolitical Calculations
The 2025 Middle East crisis signifies the decisive end of the sectarian conflict structure that has dominated the Region for 46 years since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. Analysis of each country’s responses clarifies structural change, in which sectarian identity has become a secondary factor in policy-making, with realist factors like economic pragmatism, geographic constraints, and state governance capacity taking leadership.
In this new order, wealthy oil states like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar prioritise economic development; regional powers like Egypt and Turkey struggle to maintain limited autonomy; vulnerable states like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan concentrate on survival strategies. Meanwhile, China and Russia’s strategic defeats and EU powerlessness decisively confirmed American military superiority.
America’s Geopolitical Calculations and Strategic Decision for Anti-Iran Participation
America’s direct military intervention against Iran results from cold-blooded geopolitical calculations by the Trump administration. First, an analysis of the responses of Gulf oil states clarified their realistic recognition that these countries now prioritise economic pragmatism over sectarian solidarity. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar’s demands for “restraint and de-escalation” were interpreted as effective permission for American military intervention. While superficially defending Iranian sovereignty, these countries yearned for regional stabilisation to improve energy investment environments.
Second, decisive weakening of the “axis of resistance.” The collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, decreased military capabilities of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Iraq’s policy paralysis due to triple dependency had already significantly reduced Iran’s regional influence. America judged that Iran was in regional isolation and lacked effective retaliation capabilities.
Third, strategic constraints on both China and Russia. Russia’s military depletion from the Ukraine war and China’s failed economic Middle East strategy meant both countries lost the capability to provide substantial military support to Iran. America maximised this change in excellent power dynamics to militarily resolve the Iranian nuclear issue while minimising Chinese and Russian backlash.
Fourth, European allies’ substantial acquiescence. Serious EU internal divisions and a lack of effective response capabilities meant European countries had to accept American fait accompli. Britain’s unconditional support and France and Germany’s passive tolerance confirmed America’s decisive superiority within the Atlantic alliance.
Fifth, the strategic goal of preventing Iranian nuclear development is achievable. Precision attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities could set back the country’s nuclear development program for several years, preventing regional nuclear proliferation and maintaining American military superiority in the Middle East long-term.
Design of “New-Type Military Intervention” Based on Iraq War Lessons
At the foundation of this strategic decision lies geopolitical calculations for reconstructing the power balance in the Middle East. Based on 20 years of Iraq-Afghanistan war experience, limited and precise military intervention to remove regional destabilising factors aims to maintain balance against Chinese and Russian influence expansion.
America’s judgment that this intervention could avoid Iraq War quagmires has multiple grounds. First, limited operational objectives. While the Iraq War set comprehensive goals of regime change and nation-building, this operation is limited to technical, restricted goals of nuclear facility destruction. Precision airstrikes without ground troop deployment or occupation governance can minimise political commitments.
Second, the regional countries’ acquiescent environment. Unlike the 2003 Iraq invasion, major Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt show de facto tolerance. These countries, prioritising economic pragmatism and seeking regional stability over sectarian solidarity, significantly improved America’s operational environment.
Third, Iran is an isolated state. The dismantling of the “Axis of Resistance ” left Iran without regional alliance networks and the capability to sustain long-term asymmetric warfare, like during the Iraq War. The Syrian-Lebanese route cutoff and Iraqi neutralisation significantly constrained Iranian retaliation options.
Fourth, domestic political consensus. The goal of preventing Iranian nuclear development easily gains bipartisan support domestically and can avoid the Iraq War-era domestic political divisions.
Fifth, a clear exit strategy. Immediate withdrawal after nuclear facility destruction completion can avoid long-term occupation and nation-building burdens, achieving strategic goals through “hit and run” methods.
Reconstructing Hegemonic Position in the New Geopolitical Order
America’s calculations accurately read each country’s realist interest calculations. During the transition from a sectarian passion-based regional order to a cold-blooded national interest-based order, decisive military force was used to simultaneously achieve long-term regional stability and maintain the American hegemonic position.
Based on these calculations, America positioned this operation as a “new-type military intervention that applied Iraq War lessons” and practised a “limited hegemony restoration” model, achieving strategic goals while avoiding past failures.
This historical transformation signifies modernisation of Middle Eastern politics while also suggesting the emergence of a more cold-blooded and fragmented regional order that has lost common value foundations. The future Middle East will be dominated by realist politics based on cold-blooded national interest calculations rather than sectarian passion. In that new order, American military superiority and stability mechanisms based on it are expected to continue functioning as the axis of regional politics for at least the next decade.
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