Why does the United States continue to support Israel? Even as humanitarian crises are reported and international condemnation intensifies, this stance remains unchanged. The answer lies in 1979. In that year, three historical events created the burden that binds the United States. The Camp David Accords, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—the geopolitical structure these events constructed continues to define U.S. foreign policy 45 years later. This paper analyses this structure in detail through a three-part composition. Part I elucidates the origins and mechanisms of persistence of the "three curses." America's powerlessness to stop the Gaza massacre is a structural inevitability.Prologue: October 2025—On the Day of the Third Ceasefire, Gaza Was in Ruins
On October 9, 2025, a third ceasefire took effect throughout the Gaza Strip. More than two years had passed since the war began on October 7, 2023. However, that silence was not the silence of peace, but the silence of death.
The figures shown in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report were shocking.
Table: Gaza War Statistics (as of October 2025)
| Item | Number |
| Deaths | Over 68,000 (over 70% civilians) |
| Child Deaths | Over 17,000 |
| Injured | Over 135,000 |
| Missing | Over 12,000 (under rubble) |
| Building Destruction | 70% collapsed or damaged |
| Displaced Persons | 1.9 million (85% of population) |
| Hospitals Non-functional | 34 out of 36 facilities |
| Schools Damaged | 85% of 625 schools |
| Starvation Status | 95% of population (IPC Phase 4-5) |
Gaza had been destroyed. The World Bank estimated reconstruction costs between $50 billion and $150 billion. However, there was no prospect for reconstruction.
At the moment the third ceasefire took effect, media worldwide reported on this devastation. The BBC aired “Gaza: The Scale of Destruction,” CNN broadcast aerial drone footage of the destruction, and the New York Times published satellite photographs of Gaza reduced to rubble.
As of October 2025, fighting continued sporadically, and the ceasefire had been violated many times. The war had not completely ended.
And the world asked: “Why didn’t the United States stop it?”
This question contains multiple profound mysteries.
First Mystery: Why Did the U.S. Continue to Support While Criticising?
President Biden repeatedly stated that “civilian casualties are too high.” Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer demanded Prime Minister Netanyahu’s resignation, condemning him as “the greatest obstacle to peace.” In May 2024, the United States suspended the supply of heavy bombs to Israel for the first time in history.
Yet at the same time, the U.S. provided $28.6 billion in military assistance to Israel over the two years from 2023 to 2024—7.5 times the usual annual assistance amount of $3.8 billion. What does this contradiction mean?
Second Mystery: Why Did the U.S. Consistently Exercise Its Veto at the UN?
During the 18 months from October 2023 to March 2025, seven resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza were submitted to the UN Security Council. In all of them, the United States exercised its veto. While the vast majority of the world demanded a ceasefire, only the United States continued to support Israel.
The U.S. has exercised its veto on Israel-related resolutions at the UN Security Council 57 times over the 53 years from 1972 to 2025. This accounts for more than half of all vetoes exercised by the United States. Why does the U.S. continue to protect Israel to this extent?
Third Mystery: Why Was the International Community Powerless?
The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant on war crimes charges. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a provisional measures order in May 2025 commanding Israel to “immediately cease fire.” The European Union (EU) considered economic sanctions. However, all of these failed to stop the destruction of Gaza.
As long as the United States holds veto power, the UN Security Council cannot function. While ICC arrest warrants are valid in 126 countries, the U.S. criticised them, saying it “does not recognise jurisdiction.” ICJ orders have no enforcement power. The international community was powerless before Israel and the United States behind it.
Fourth Mystery: Why Won’t Netanyahu End the War?
Opinion polls within Israel show that 64% call for Netanyahu’s resignation. 66% support ending the war. Trust in the military is 77%, but trust in Netanyahu is only 46%. A majority of Israeli citizens do not trust Netanyahu.
Nevertheless, Netanyahu continues the war. While a ceasefire took effect on January 19, 2025, fighting resumed just two months later on March 22. Won’t the war end as long as Netanyahu’s trial continues? Hasn’t Israel become “Netanyahu’s hostage”?
Fifth Mystery: When Did This Structure Begin?
All these mysteries connect to one fundamental question: Why does the United States continue to support Israel while facing worldwide criticism and deepening international isolation? Why has the U.S. fallen into a state of “wanting to stop but unable to stop”?
The answer to this question is not in 2025. Nor is it in the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. It goes back much further into the past.
This paper will solve this mystery.
Why? Seeking that answer, we go back to 1948.
Part I: The Origins of Darkness—1948-1979, Until America Shouldered the Burden
Chapter 1: From Founding to Isolation—1948-1960
On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared “the independence of the State of Israel” in Tel Aviv. At this moment, a new nation was born in the Middle East. However, simultaneously, the “Nakba (catastrophe)” began, in which 750,000 Palestinians were driven from their homes. This was not merely a founding, but an earthquake that fundamentally changed Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The day after the declaration of independence, five countries—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon—declared war on Israel. This was the beginning of the First Arab-Israeli War. A fledgling nation with a population of only 600,000 was fighting an Arab coalition with a population of tens of millions. However, Israel won. By the 1949 armistice agreements, its controlled territory expanded from 56% in the UN partition plan to 78% of all of Palestine.
This victory also marked the beginning of international isolation. The entire Arab world viewed Israel as an “invader” and refused diplomatic relations. Israel became a completely isolated entity in the Middle East.
America’s position was ambiguous. President Harry Truman announced state recognition 11 minutes after the declaration of independence, becoming the first country in the world to recognise Israel. However, this was not a strategic judgment but a domestic political consideration. 1948 was an election year, and Truman needed the support of Jewish voters. The State Department and the Defence Department opposed it. Their concerns were clear: recognising Israel would antagonise the Arab world and jeopardise access to Middle Eastern oil. But Truman prioritised political judgment.
1.1 The 1956 Suez Crisis—Distrust of Allies
In 1956, the Suez Crisis dramatically changed Middle Eastern geopolitics. On July 26, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. For Britain and France, the canal was a lifeline connecting the Middle East and Asia. Britain and France made a secret agreement with Israel. Israel would invade Egypt, and Britain and France would militarily intervene under the pretext of “securing the canal.”
On October 29, the Israel Defence Forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula. On November 5, British and French forces landed at Port Said. Militarily, it was successful. Israel occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, and British and French forces seized the Suez Canal zone. But at that moment, the United States intervened.
President Dwight Eisenhower was furious. Britain, France, and Israel had begun military action without prior notification to the U.S. During the Cold War, there was a risk that the Soviet Union would use this opportunity to approach Egypt and expand its influence in the Middle East. Eisenhower demanded immediate withdrawal from Britain, France, and Israel. When Britain refused, the U.S. launched a financial attack on the British pound. The pound plummeted, and the British economy fell into crisis. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden capitulated and announced withdrawal on November 6. France and Israel followed. By March 1957, Israeli forces had withdrawn entirely from the Sinai Peninsula.
For Israel, this experience was humiliating. Despite their military victory, they were forced to abandon all their gains under U.S. pressure. And Israeli leaders learned a decisive lesson: traditional allies cannot be trusted. The United States will abandon Israel for its own interests.
This lesson changed Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s strategic thinking. Israel needs an ultimate deterrence that depends on no one. That is nuclear weapons.
1.2 Secret Alliance with France
After the Suez Crisis failure, Britain reduced its involvement in the Middle East. But France was different. France was fighting an independence war in Algeria, and was furious that Nasser’s Egypt was supporting the Algerian independence movement, FLN (National Liberation Front). For France, Israel was a potential ally with a “common enemy.”
In October 1957, France and Israel signed a secret nuclear cooperation agreement. France would support Israel in building a reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert. This agreement was top secret. Not only was the international community unaware, but even the United States was not informed. At this moment, the path to Israel’s nuclear armament was opened.
Table: Key Events 1948-1960
| Year | Event | Main Actors | Outcome |
| May 1948 | Israeli Declaration of Independence, Nakba | Ben-Gurion, Truman | The First Arab-Israeli War erupts |
| 1949 | Armistice Agreement | Israel, 5 Arab countries | Territory expansion (56%→78%), complete isolation in the Middle East |
| October 1956 | Suez Crisis (Britain-France-Israel alliance) | Eden, Ben-Gurion | Sinai occupation, military victory |
| November 1956 | U.S. intervention | Eisenhower | British pound collapse, forced withdrawal |
| March 1957 | Sinai withdrawal complete | Israel | All military gains abandoned, distrust of allies |
| October 1957 | France-Israel secret nuclear cooperation agreement | France, Ben-Gurion | Path to nuclear armament opened |
Ben-Gurion stated in a 1960 speech: “Small countries cannot depend on large countries. Large countries abandon small countries for their own interests. Israel must guarantee its survival with its own hands.” These words were the very lesson of the Suez Crisis.
The 12 years from 1948 to 1960 were a decisive period that shaped the character of the State of Israel. Surrounded entirely by hostile nations, a small country of only a few million people faced an Arab world of hundreds of millions. This situation created a unique strategic culture in Israel: absolute self-reliance, preemptive strikes, and ultimate survival guarantee through nuclear weapons. This national character was nurtured in isolation from 1948 to 1960. And in 1957, having gained France as an “accomplice,” Israel began walking the path toward nuclear armament.
Chapter 2: France’s Dangerous Gift—Secret Nuclear Armament (1957-1967)
2.1 “The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend”—Birth of the Franco-Israeli Secret Nuclear Agreement
The 1956 Suez Crisis left Israel with a decisive lesson: international isolation, and above all, the cold reality that even allies cannot be trusted. Through this crisis, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion became convinced: “Small countries must guarantee their survival with their own hands. That guarantee is absolute deterrence, namely nuclear weapons.”
Meanwhile, France across the Mediterranean also harboured intense humiliation and anger. The Algerian War of Independence, which began in 1954, had become a quagmire, and Egyptian President Nasser was supporting the independence force, the FLN (National Liberation Front of Algeria). Furthermore, in the Suez Crisis, the U.S. Eisenhower administration forced France and Britain to withdraw. The pride of the former colonial powers fell to the ground, and distrust of the Atlantic alliance reached its peak.
Under these circumstances, France and Israel found a common enemy in Nasser. The classical strategic logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” connected the two countries across the Mediterranean. In October 1957, a secret agreement was concluded in Paris. France agreed to support Israel in building a plutonium production reactor and providing the technology necessary for nuclear weapons development. This agreement was treated as top secret and was not even reported to the French Parliament.
France’s motivations were not just revenge sentiment. In the political chaos of the late Fourth Republic, some officials in the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Energy Commission viewed nuclear cooperation with Israel as a symbol of “France’s strategic autonomy.” While pursuing an independent nuclear strategy not dependent on the United States, Israel was an ideal partner and testing ground. Exporting technology developed at the Marcoule reactor and fostering “proxy nuclear power” in the Middle East were also intended to expand French influence.
2.2 Secret City in the Desert—Dimona Reactor Construction
In 1958, a top-secret construction project began on the outskirts of Dimona, a small city in the Negev Desert. Officially named the “Negev Nuclear Research Centre,” signs posted claimed it was a “textile factory” or a “desert irrigation research institute.” However, the reality was a full-scale military reactor facility aimed at plutonium production.
The core of the Dimona facility was a natural uranium graphite-moderated reactor of the same type as the French Marcoule reactor. This reactor type was inefficient for power generation but optimised for plutonium production. The facility consisted of four main parts: First, the reactor itself, with a thermal output of 24 megawatts. Second, a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from spent fuel. Third, a plant to produce heavy water used as the reactor’s moderator. And fourth, a nuclear weapon assembly facility built deep underground. The existence of this underground facility was concealed from the outside for many years.
Construction was led by the French state enterprise Saint-Gobain Techniques, and about 2,500 French technicians were dispatched to Israel. They carried forged identity documents rather than French passports to conceal their involvement in the project. Total construction costs exceeded $100 million, equivalent to about 10% of Israel’s GDP at the time. The scale of resources that small Israel poured into this project, with the nation’s fate at stake, speaks to the depth of its obsession with nuclear armament.
Construction proceeded rapidly. By 1960, the main structure of the reactor building was completed, and in 1963, the reactor reached criticality. Plutonium production had begun. Simultaneously, Israeli scientists were advancing research on nuclear weapons design at the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre. Theoretical calculations, implosion lens design, and detonation device development—all technologies necessary for nuclear weapon manufacture were accumulated in parallel.
Table 2-1: Composition of Dimona Reactor Facility
| Facility Name | Function | Technical Specifications | Construction Period |
| Main Reactor | Plutonium production | Natural uranium graphite-moderated reactor, 24MW thermal output | 1958-1963 |
| Reprocessing Facility | Plutonium extraction | PUREX method, annual processing capacity 40kg Pu | 1960-1965 |
| Heavy Water Plant | Heavy water production | Girdler sulfide method | 1959-1962 |
| Underground Assembly Facility | Nuclear weapon manufacturing | 6-level underground structure, total area classified | 1960-1966 |
2.3 Reactor “Ignition” and Path to Nuclear Weapon Completion
1963 was a turning point for Israel’s nuclear development. In the first half of that year, the Dimona reactor reached criticality, and plutonium production began in earnest. The fissile material necessary for nuclear weapon manufacture was in Israeli hands for the first time. Manufacturing one nuclear bomb requires about 5 kilograms of plutonium. Dimona’s annual production capacity was estimated at 40 kilograms, theoretically enabling the manufacture of 8 nuclear weapons per year.
However, in June 1963, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the most excellent promoter of nuclear development, suddenly resigned. The official reason was “fatigue,” but there were complex political factors in the background. His successor, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, was not as obsessed with nuclear armament as Ben-Gurion, but the project had already reached a point of no return. Enormous investments had been made, thousands of scientists and technicians were involved, and facilities were near completion. The project quietly continued.
From 1964 to 1966, Israel’s nuclear weapon development entered its final stage. Plutonium was extracted in the reprocessing facility, nuclear weapon designs were completed at the Soreq laboratory, and actual weapon assembly was performed in underground facilities. The exact timing of when Israel completed its first nuclear bomb has not been officially revealed to this day. However, according to analyses by multiple historians and intelligence agencies, it is estimated that Israel came to possess at least 1 to 2 nuclear weapons between late 1966 and early 1967.
And in June 1967, the Six-Day War erupted. The Israeli military overwhelmingly and rapidly defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, occupying the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In this war, Israel demonstrated overwhelming military superiority with conventional weapons, but behind the war existed a secret deterrent. According to some Israel Defence Forces materials, before the war began, nuclear devices were reportedly transported from Dimona by special forces and placed on standby for “any eventuality.” Whether this measure was actually taken has not been confirmed, but if true, it would mean Israel already possessed nuclear weapons in an operationally ready state.
Through the victory in the Six-Day War, Israel established its position as the Middle East’s military power. But behind this, a more serious change was occurring. Israel had secretly become a nuclear power, and the Middle East power balance had fundamentally transformed. The nuclear weapons created in the secret facility in the Negev Desert became the foundation of Israel’s subsequent security policy. Also, they became a factor that would decisively change relations with the United States. However, that is another story to be discussed in Chapter 3 and beyond.
Table 2-2: Major Milestones in Israeli Nuclear Development
| Date | Event | Significance |
| October 1957 | France-Israel secret nuclear cooperation agreement signed | Official start of the nuclear development project |
| 1958 | Dimona reactor construction begins | Start of physical facility construction |
| 1960 | Reactor building main structure completed | Mid-point achievement of the construction project |
| 1963 | Reactor reaches criticality, plutonium production begins | Acquisition of nuclear material production capability |
| June 1963 | Ben-Gurion resigns | Change of promoter, but the project continues |
| 1966-1967 | First nuclear weapons completed (estimated) | Achievement of nuclear power status |
| June 1967 | Six-Day War, nuclear devices on standby (unconfirmed) | Potential operational use of nuclear deterrent |
As of 1967, Israel had secretly become a nuclear power. This fact would eventually be discovered by the world, particularly the United States. And that discovery would bring a decisive transformation to U.S.-Israeli relations.
Chapter 3: Discovery and Tacit Approval—America’s Anguish and Compromise (1960-1969)
3.1 CIA’s Shock—Exposure of the Desert Secret
In December 1960, the U.S. CIA was analysing aerial photographs of the Negev Desert taken by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. What appeared there was not the “textile factory” or “research facility” that Israel claimed. Enormous cooling towers, characteristic dome-shaped buildings, and heavily guarded security facilities surrounding them—all were typical features of a reactor facility. CIA nuclear proliferation analysts immediately concluded: “Israel is secretly building a military reactor.”
This discovery shocked Washington at the end of the Eisenhower administration. The United States had made nuclear non-proliferation a pillar of its foreign policy, and secret nuclear development by an ally was absolutely unacceptable. However, it was a transition period from Eisenhower to Kennedy in January 1961, and the immediate response was difficult. This issue would weigh heavily on the shoulders of the young new President, John F. Kennedy.
Kennedy, immediately after taking office, positioned Israel’s nuclear development as one of the top priorities in diplomacy. In May 1961, at a summit with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, he strongly demanded inspection of the Dimona facility. In letter exchanges, Kennedy’s tone gradually became harsher: “The lack of transparency regarding your country’s nuclear development program will have serious effects on bilateral relations.” Using military and economic aid as leverage, Kennedy continued to pressure Israel.
Ben-Gurion was cornered. Abandoning nuclear development meant abandoning Israel’s survival strategy itself. But he also had to avoid decisive confrontation with the United States. What he chose was clever deception. In 1961 and 1962, Ben-Gurion admitted U.S. scientist inspection teams to Dimona. But it was a “Potemkin village.” Entrances to reprocessing facilities were hidden with false walls, and underground nuclear weapon assembly facilities were concealed entirely. What the inspection team was shown was only the surface of a “peaceful research reactor.”
3.2 Kennedy Assassination and Policy Shift—Johnson Administration’s “Strategic Tacit Approval”
1963 was a decisive turning point for U.S. policy on Israel’s nuclear program. In June, Ben-Gurion, unable to withstand intense pressure, resigned as prime minister. And on November 22, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Lyndon B. Johnson, who succeeded him as vice president, viewed Israel from an entirely different perspective than his predecessor.
Johnson was a realist who valued Israel’s strategic worth in the Middle East. In the mid-1960s, the Cold War intensified, and the Soviet Union was expanding its influence in Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In this geopolitical context, Johnson and his advisors came to view Israel as “the West’s unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Middle East.” Strategic reassessment led to the conclusion that a nuclear-armed Israel could become a powerful deterrent to Soviet influence expansion.
Under the Johnson administration, U.S. policy on Israel’s nuclear program quietly shifted from “strong opposition” to “strategic tacit approval.” Inspections formally continued, but their frequency and strictness were significantly relaxed. From 1964 to 1967, while Israel advanced the final stages of nuclear weapons, the United States effectively turned a blind eye. During this period, U.S. military aid to Israel surged. Aid amounts that were $13 million annually in 1962 ballooned to $90 million in 1966—about 7 times larger.
Table 3-1: Trends in U.S. Military Aid to Israel (1962-1968)
| Fiscal Year | Military Aid (Million USD) | Year-over-Year Increase | Major Weapons Provided |
| 1962 | 13 | – | Small arms, transport vehicles |
| 1963 | 15 | +15% | Anti-aircraft missiles (Hawk) |
| 1964 | 37 | +147% | M48 tanks, armoured vehicles |
| 1965 | 71 | +92% | A-4 attack aircraft |
| 1966 | 90 | +27% | Additional A-4, transport aircraft |
| 1967 | 24 | -73% | Temporary reduction post-Six-Day War |
| 1968 | 106 | +342% | F-4 Phantom fighters |
This surge in aid was not a mere coincidence. It was part of an implicit deal to strengthen Israel with conventional weapons as compensation for tacitly approving nuclear development, and to protect U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.
3.3 Six-Day War Shock and CIA Final Assessment
On June 5, 1967, the Six-Day War erupted. Early in the morning, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack on Egyptian air bases, destroying most of the Arab coalition’s air power in just 3 hours. In a 6-day blitzkrieg, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, expanding its territory to about four times its pre-war size. This overwhelming victory impressed upon the world Israel’s military superiority.
But behind the war, the CIA was deepening different concerns. Just before the war, intelligence agencies obtained fragmentary information suggesting Israel had placed nuclear devices in some form of “readiness state.” If Israel had faced the crisis of defeat, the possibility of nuclear weapon use was not zero. This recognition posed serious problems for Washington policymakers. The reality that a nuclear power had been born in the Middle East could no longer be ignored.
In 1968, the CIA produced a final assessment report. Its conclusion was clear: “Israel possesses nuclear weapons.” Based on analysis of Dimona’s plutonium production capacity, progress in nuclear weapon design, and delivery means (Jericho ballistic missiles and modified Phantom fighters), the report concluded that Israel possessed at least several nuclear weapons. This report was handed over to President-elect Richard Nixon.
Table 3-2: Comparison of Israel Nuclear Policies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations
| Administration | Period | Basic Stance | Inspection Policy | Military Aid | Key Figures’ Statement |
| Kennedy | 1961-1963 | Strong opposition | Strict inspection demands are implemented twice annually | Restrained (around $15 million/year) | “Nuclear proliferation is unacceptable” (Kennedy) |
| Johnson | 1963-1969 | Strategic tacit approval | Relaxed to formal inspections | Surged ($90 million in 1966) | “Israel is a strategic asset” (Secretary of State Rusk) |
| Nixon | 1969-1974 | Official tacit approval | Inspections ceased, secret agreement concluded | Large-scale provision (hundreds of millions/year) | “Don’t ask, don’t tell” (Nixon-Meir secret agreement) |
3.4 Nixon-Meir Secret Agreement—Birth of the “Ambiguity Policy”
In January 1969, Richard Nixon was inaugurated as the 37th President. His National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, sought a realistic solution to the Israeli nuclear issue. Kissinger’s analysis was cold: “Israel’s nuclear possession is a fait accompli. It is impossible to reverse it, and attempting to do so would paralyse U.S. Middle East policy. The question is how to coexist with this reality.”
On September 26, 1969, Nixon held a secret meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in Washington. At this meeting, both reached a historic secret agreement. Its content would later become known as the “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. The United States would not officially ask about or approve Israel’s nuclear weapon possession. Israel would not officially declare nuclear weapon possession and would not conduct nuclear tests. And both countries would perpetually maintain this “ambiguity”—this was the core of the secret agreement.
Through this secret agreement, Israel secured de facto status as a nuclear power while avoiding international condemnation and sanctions. The United States sealed the diplomatic nightmare of an ally’s nuclear proliferation as “non-existent” and preserved freedom of action in Middle East policy. However, this secret agreement came with a significant price. The United States assumed a de facto perpetual commitment to Israel’s security as compensation for tacitly approving Israel’s nuclear armament.
Table 3-3: Timeline of U.S.-Israel Nuclear Issues 1960-1969
| Date | Event | U.S. Response | Israeli Response |
| December 1960 | CIA discovers Dimona via U-2 reconnaissance | The Eisenhower administration demands an explanation | Claims “textile factory” |
| May 1961 | Kennedy meets with Ben-Gurion | Demands inspection, intensifies pressure | Agrees to accept formal inspection |
| 1961-1962 | U.S. inspection teams visit Dimona | Doubts “peaceful use” report | Deceives with “Potemkin village” |
| June 1963 | Ben-Gurion resigns | Evaluates pressure as effective | New PM Eshkol continues the project |
| November 1963 | Kennedy assassinated | Vice President Johnson elevated | Recognises reduced pressure |
| 1964-1966 | Nuclear weapons completion phase | Relaxes inspections, tacit approval stance | Completes nuclear armament in secret |
| June 1967 | Six-Day War | Reassesses Israeli military power | Nuclear devices are possibly on standby |
| 1968 | CIA report “Israel possesses nuclear weapons” | Recognises as fact | Continues official denial |
| September 1969 | Nixon-Meir secret agreement | Agrees to “Don’t ask, don’t tell” | Establishes ambiguity policy |
Through the September 1969 secret agreement, U.S.-Israeli relations entered a new phase. It was not merely an alliance relationship, but a special bond sharing nuclear secrets. This secret agreement became the foundation of bilateral relations for more than half a century thereafter and simultaneously became the first link in the burden that America carries. How this secret agreement came to bind U.S. Middle East policy and constrain America’s response to the 2025 Gaza war—this will be detailed in Chapter 4 and beyond. However, at that point in 1969, almost no one could foresee those grave consequences.
Chapter 4: The Trap of Strategic Dependence—The 1973 War and Completion of the Burden (1970-1979)
4.1 Birth of the “Samson Option”—Logic of Nuclear Blackmail
The 1969 Nixon-Meir secret agreement wrapped Israel’s nuclear possession in the cloak of “ambiguity.” However, this ambiguity was by no means harmless. It functioned as strategic deterrence while also being an invisible chain binding the United States.
In the early 1970s, Israeli strategic planners systematised nuclear weapon operational doctrine. At its core was the concept of the “Samson Option.” Samson, the mighty hero who appears in the Book of Judges in the Old Testament, when captured by the Philistines, brought down the temple pillars, destroying himself along with his enemies. Following this myth, Israel’s nuclear doctrine included an extreme retaliatory strategy: “In a crisis of national survival, burn the enemy and the entire Middle East in nuclear flames.”
The terror of this strategy lay in its asymmetry. What did “crisis of national survival” mean for Israel? The definition was ambiguous and left to Israel’s subjective judgment. Did defeat in conventional warfare constitute a “crisis of national survival”? Would the fall of Jerusalem be a trigger? This uncertainty was both the source of the Samson Option’s deterrent power and America’s nightmare. If Israel fell into a disadvantageous position in a conventional war, the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons could not be denied. And nuclear war in the Middle East carried the danger of escalating into direct U.S.-Soviet superpower confrontation—namely, World War III.
Table 4-1: Israeli Nuclear Forces Estimate (1970-1979)
| Year | Estimated Nuclear Warheads | Primary Delivery Systems | Range | Target Assumptions |
| 1970 | 10-20 | Jericho-I ballistic missiles | 500km | Major cities in Egypt and Syria |
| 1973 | 20-30 | Jericho-I, F-4 fighters | 500km/1,600km | Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad |
| 1975 | 30-50 | Jericho-I, F-4, F-15 | 500km/2,000km+ | All of the Middle East |
| 1979 | 50-80 | Jericho-II under development, F-15, F-16 | 1,500km/2,500km+ | All of the Middle East + Iran |
4.2 Yom Kippur War Shock—On the Brink of Nuclear Use
On October 6, 1973, at the holiest hour of the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and invaded the Sinai Peninsula, while Syrian forces poured into the Golan Heights. This was a carefully prepared war of revenge by Arab countries that had suffered a humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War.
In the early stages of the war, Israeli forces were at a disadvantage. On the Golan Heights, Syrian armoured units broke through Israel’s defence line and advanced toward the Sea of Galilee. If the Golan Heights fell, the heart of northern Israel would be directly threatened. On the Sinai front, too, Egyptian anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles tormented Israeli armoured and air forces. On October 8, just two days after the war began, Israeli tank forces were forced to commit reserve forces, and ammunition and fuel stockpiles were rapidly depleting.
Under these critical circumstances, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan made an unprecedented decision. They removed nuclear warheads from Dimona and loaded them onto Jericho ballistic missiles and F-4 fighters, placing them in launch readiness. This measure was kept strictly secret, but U.S. reconnaissance satellites and intelligence agencies detected abnormally active Israeli nuclear activities. On the early morning of October 9, the CIA provided an emergency briefing to President Nixon: “There is a high probability that Israel has placed nuclear weapons in operational readiness.”
Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger immediately understood the seriousness of the situation. If Israel could not reverse its disadvantage, it might resort to nuclear weapons. And nuclear war in the Middle East could invite Soviet intervention and escalate into a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. Nixon decided, “We must save Israel. That is the only way to prevent nuclear war.”
On October 12, the United States launched “Operation Nickel Grass,” the largest emergency airlift operation in history. C-5 and C-141 transport aircraft airlifted weapons and ammunition to Israel around the clock. Tanks, armoured vehicles, anti-tank missiles, aircraft parts, precision-guided bombs—all the supplies the Israeli military needed were delivered across the Atlantic. The total volume of airlifted supplies reached 22,000 tons, a scale comparable to the Berlin Airlift during World War II.
Table 4-2: Operation Nickel Grass (October 12-November 14, 1973)
| Item | Scale |
| Operation Period | 33 days (October 12-November 14) |
| Total Flights | 566 (C-5: 145, C-141: 421) |
| Total Airlift Volume | 22,325 tons |
| Major Weapons Provided | 40 M60 tanks, 36 A-4 attack aircraft, 46 F-4 fighters, 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles, AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, precision-guided bombs |
| Total Cost | Approximately $2.2 billion (grant) |
| Participating Bases | U.S. East Coast, Germany, Portugal (Lajes Base, Azores) |
Through this massive airlift, Israeli forces turned to counterattack. From mid-October onward, they pushed back Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, and on the Sinai front crossed the Suez Canal in reverse and encircled the Egyptian Third Army. On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted a ceasefire resolution, and on October 25, the ceasefire took effect. The nuclear brink had barely been avoided.
4.3 Post-War Strategic Reorganization—Institutionalization of the U.S.-Israel “Special Relationship”
The Yom Kippur War fundamentally transformed U.S.-Israeli relations. Before the war, relations between the two countries were limited to military cooperation. However, through the war, the United States recognised that Israel’s survival was America’s own vital interest. The reason was not only Israel’s strategic value. More important was the risk that Israel’s defeat would trigger nuclear weapon use and drag the U.S. into an uncontrollable nuclear war.
From 1974 to 1979, the U.S.-Israel “special relationship” was institutionalised. Military aid increased dramatically, doubling from $1 billion to $2 billion annually. More important was the change in the nature of aid. It was no longer mere arms sales, but priority provision of cutting-edge weapons, joint development, technology transfer, and intelligence sharing became routine. Cutting-edge aircraft such as F-15 and F-16 fighters were provided to Israel, and Israel established overwhelming air superiority in the Middle East.
Table 4-3: U.S. Military and Economic Aid to Israel (1970-1979, millions of dollars)
| Fiscal Year | Military Aid | Economic Aid | Total | Major Weapons Provided |
| 1970 | 30 | 40 | 70 | Additional A-4 attack aircraft |
| 1971 | 545 | 55 | 600 | F-4 Phantom fighters |
| 1972 | 300 | 104 | 404 | Armoured vehicles, missiles |
| 1973 | 307 | 60 | 367 | Regular annual provision |
| 1974 | 2,482 | 377 | 2,859 | Post-Yom Kippur War emergency aid |
| 1975 | 300 | 598 | 898 | First provision of F-15 fighters |
| 1976 | 1,500 | 751 | 2,251 | Additional F-15, F-16 contract |
| 1977 | 1,000 | 785 | 1,785 | First provision of F-16 |
| 1978 | 1,000 | 785 | 1,785 | Post-Camp David Accords aid |
| 1979 | 3,000 | 2,121 | 5,121 | Camp David implementation support, large-scale military modernisation |
| Total | 10,464 | 5,676 | 16,140 | – |
However, this “special relationship” came with a significant price. To avoid Israel’s nuclear blackmail, the United States had to guarantee Israel’s overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. In other words, it assumed the obligation to continuously provide cutting-edge weapons to prevent Israel from falling into a “crisis of survival.” This was effectively an indefinite blank check for Israel’s security. This was the completion of the “Second Curse—the Curse of the Samson Option.”
4.4 Iranian Revolution and Shouldering the Burden Completely Alone—1979 as a Turning Point
1979 was a decisive turning point for U.S. Middle East strategy and U.S.-Israeli relations. The Iranian Islamic Revolution that occurred this year was not merely a regime change in one country, but a tectonic shift that fundamentally overturned the entire strategic order the United States had built in the Middle East. And this revolution was the historical event that made America shoulder the burden completely and alone.
4.4.1 Collapse of America’s “Twin Pillars” Strategy
In the 1970s, U.S. Middle East strategy was based on a structure called the “Twin Pillars” policy. The two pillars were Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran, in particular, under the pro-American King Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (the Shah), was the most important base guaranteeing stability in the Gulf region.
Iran’s strategic value to the United States was multi-layered. First, military value. Iran was a geographic breakwater against the Soviet southward expansion policy. As long as Iran, adjacent to the Soviet border, had a pro-American regime, Soviet influence expansion into the Middle East could be blocked. The United States provided Iran with large quantities of cutting-edge weapons, essentially cultivating it as a “regional policeman.” F-14 Tomcat fighters, F-4 Phantoms, M60 tanks, Hawk missiles—except for Israel, Iran possessed the most powerful military force in the Middle East.
Second, intelligence value. In Iran’s northern border region, U.S. CIA and NSA intelligence facilities were installed, intercepting communications within the Soviet Union and monitoring missile tests. These facilities were essential to U.S. intelligence activities during the Cold War.
Third, energy security. Iran produced 6 million barrels of oil per day and guaranteed stability of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. One-third of the world’s oil shipments passed through this strait, and its safety was protected by the Iranian Navy.
Fourth, economic value. Iran was one of the largest customers for American-made weapons, signing weapon purchase contracts worth billions of dollars annually in the 1970s. This was a huge market for the U.S. defense industry.
Table 4-4: Strategic Value Iran Provided to the United States (1970s)
| Strategic Function | Specific Content | Importance to the United States |
| Anti-Soviet Breakwater | 2,000km border blocks Soviet southward expansion | Geographic keystone of Cold War strategy |
| Intelligence Base | U.S. intelligence facilities in north, Soviet monitoring | Core of SIGINT (signals intelligence) |
| Gulf Stability Guarantee | Security of Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz | Protects one-third of world oil transport |
| Energy Supply | 6 million barrels/day oil production | Western energy security |
| Weapons Market | Billions of dollars annually in U.S. weapons purchases | Major customer for defense industry |
| Regional Policeman | Maintains order in Gulf region | Alternative to direct U.S. military deployment |
4.4.2 Storm of Revolution—January to February 1979
From late 1978, protest demonstrations against the Shah regime intensified throughout Iran. Popular uprisings with religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as spiritual leader continued to expand despite suppression by the Shah’s secret police SAVAK. On January 16, 1979, the Shah fled the country. And on February 1, Khomeini, returning from Paris, was greeted by millions of crowds. On February 11, the revolution completely succeeded, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established.
The U.S. Carter administration could not respond to the rapid development of events. Carter initially tried to resolve the situation by promoting reforms of the Shah regime, but revolutionary momentum did not allow it. And the revolutionary regime adopted a strongly anti-American stance. Khomeini called the United States the “Great Satan” and denounced that all of Iran’s misfortunes originated from American imperialism. On November 4, revolutionary students occupied the U.S. Embassy and took 52 diplomats hostage. This “hostage crisis” lasted 444 days, continuing to expose America’s powerlessness to the world.
4.4.3 What Was Lost—Emergence of Strategic Vacuum
What the United States lost through the Iranian Revolution was immeasurable. Militarily, it lost its geographic breakwater against the Soviet Union. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, expanding influence in Central Asia. U.S. intelligence facilities were closed, and Soviet monitoring capabilities declined significantly. In energy terms, Iranian oil production plummeted, and the Second Oil Crisis occurred. Oil prices tripled from $13 to $40 per barrel, and the world economy fell into serious recession. And militarily, all cutting-edge weapons provided to Iran fell into the hands of the revolutionary regime, with even the danger that some would be handed over to the Soviet Union.
Even more serious was the structural geopolitical change. The geographic scope of U.S. influence in the Middle East dramatically shrank. Before the revolution, the United States covered the Middle East with an “arc” of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. But Iran’s defection divided this arc. From the Gulf region to the Levant, Israel became virtually the only ally the United States could trust across the vast area.
Table 4-5: Comparison of U.S. Middle East Alliance Structure Before and After Iranian Revolution
| Region | Before Revolution (1978) | After Revolution (1979 onward) | Change |
| Turkey | NATO ally (pro-American) | Continues | No change |
| Iran | Most important ally (pro-American) | Anti-American Islamic Republic | Complete loss |
| Iraq | Soviet-leaning, hostile | Attempts neutralization in Iran-Iraq War | Limited rapprochement |
| Saudi Arabia | Ally (pro-American) | Continues but destabilized | Threat of Islamic revolution |
| Egypt | Ally after Camp David | Continues | No change |
| Jordan | Ally (pro-American) | Continues | No change |
| Syria | Soviet ally (hostile) | Continues | No change |
| Israel | Special ally | Only fully reliable base | Strategic value surges |
4.4.4 Complete Dependence on Israel—Completion of the “Third Curse”
The loss of Iran forced fundamental reconstruction of U.S. Middle East strategy. And placed at the center of that reconstruction was Israel. Before the revolution, Israel was an important ally to the United States but not its only base. However, after 1979, Israel became “the irreplaceable sole strategic base” for the United States.
This change was clearly reflected in the surge of aid amounts. Aid to Israel in fiscal year 1979 surged to about 3 times the previous year’s $1.785 billion, reaching $5.121 billion. This was not mere aid increase but institutionalization of strategic dependence. The United States assumed the obligation to absolutely guarantee Israel’s military superiority. Because if Israel weakened, the U.S. would completely lose its reliable base in the Middle East.
More importantly, this dependence decisively constrained America’s diplomatic freedom. Before the Iranian Revolution, the United States had some room to pressure Israel. If Israel did not comply with U.S. requests, America had Iran as an alternative base. But after 1979, that option disappeared. Israel fully recognized that it was “irreplaceable” to the United States and began to maximize use of that position. It became virtually impossible for the United States to pressure Israel.
This was the completion of the “Third Curse—the Curse of Strategic Dependence.” The “First Curse” through the 1969 nuclear secret agreement, the “Second Curse” through the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the “Third Curse” through the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Through this triple curse, the United States came to shoulder the burden completely and alone.
Table 4-6: Structure of the “Three Curses”
| Curse | Year Established | Event | Content | Constraint on U.S. |
| First Curse: Nuclear Secret Curse | 1969 | Nixon-Meir secret agreement | Tacit approval of Israeli nuclear possession and ambiguity policy | Perpetual commitment to Israeli security as compensation for tacitly approving nuclear proliferation |
| Second Curse: Samson Option Curse | 1973 | Yom Kippur War | Israeli nuclear use crisis and U.S. emergency large-scale military support | Obligation to constantly guarantee military superiority to prevent Israel from falling into “crisis of survival” |
| Third Curse: Strategic Dependence Curse | 1979 | Iranian Islamic Revolution | Loss of U.S.’s largest base in Middle East, Israel becomes sole reliable base | Complete dependence on Israel, loss of room for diplomatic pressure |
Table 4-7: Timeline of Major Events 1970-1979
| Date | Event | U.S. Response | Israeli Position | Strategic Significance |
| September 1970 | Jordan Civil War (Black September) | Requests Israel prepare for intervention | Deters Syrian invasion | Confirms Israel’s regional stabilization function |
| October 1973 | Yom Kippur War erupts | Operation Nickel Grass emergency airlift | Nuclear readiness (unconfirmed) | Second Curse completed, First Oil Crisis |
| 1974 | Ceasefire agreements with Syria and Egypt | Kissinger “shuttle diplomacy” | Returns some territory | Beginning of Arab-Israeli dialogue |
| 1975 | Lebanese Civil War begins | Non-intervention | Strengthens southern border security | Collapse of Lebanese state function |
| November 1977 | President Sadat visits Jerusalem | Begins peace mediation | PM Begin receives him | Split within Arab League |
| September 1978 | Camp David Accords | President Carter mediates | Agrees to return Sinai | Egypt-Israel peace framework |
| January-February 1979 | Iranian Islamic Revolution | Shah flees, strategic restructuring | Recognizes surge in strategic value | Third Curse completed |
| March 1979 | Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty | Begins large-scale aid to both countries | First diplomatic relations with Arab world | Arab League expels Egypt |
| November 1979 | U.S. Embassy occupation (Tehran) | Hostage rescue fails | Observes U.S. weakening | Loss of U.S. prestige in Middle East |
| December 1979 | Soviet invasion of Afghanistan | Shifts to hardline anti-Soviet stance | Israeli anti-Soviet value rises | Cold War intensifies, Middle East destabilizes |
When December 31, 1979 ended this turbulent year, the United States faced a new reality. The strategic structure in the Middle East had completely changed, and the U.S. became completely dependent on Israel. This dependent relationship continued for more than 40 years thereafter and came to decisively constrain America’s response to the 2025 Gaza war. Whatever Israel does, the United States cannot stop it—the origin of this structural powerlessness was in the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
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