After examining the "three curses" in Part I and the "blood dividend" in Part II, we have seen how this structure was maintained through a delicate balance for 45 years. However, in 2017, the advent of the Trump and Netanyahu administrations destroyed this equilibrium. Unconditional support created an uncontrollable Israel, leading to the tragedy of October 7, 2023. Part III depicts the process of collapse and its consequences. And ultimately, it asks: Can the United States escape from this inescapable burden?Part III: The Collapse of Equilibrium — The Uncontrollable Israel Created by Unconditional Support
Chapter 7: Netanyahu’s Rise — Political Struggles with U.S. Presidents (2009-2020)
7.1 Confrontation with the Obama Administration — Challenge Using the Burden as a Shield
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th President of the United States. He campaigned on “change” and promised to revise Middle East policy. Particularly on the Palestinian issue, he demanded a freeze on settlement expansion and demonstrated a serious commitment to pursuing a two-state solution. However, just two months later, on March 31, Benjamin Netanyahu became Israel’s Prime Minister. The encounter between these two leaders marked the beginning of a new era of tension in U.S.-Israel relations.
Netanyahu fundamentally distrusted Obama’s Middle East policy. He was particularly alarmed by Obama’s attempts to engage in dialogue with Iran. In May 2009, when Obama demanded a settlement freeze during their first meeting at the White House, Netanyahu publicly refused. “The natural growth of settlements cannot be stopped. This is a matter of Israeli sovereignty.” For an Israeli Prime Minister to reject a U.S. President’s request in public — this was an unprecedented situation.
Behind Netanyahu’s boldness was a deep understanding of the “three curses.” He knew that it was structurally impossible for the United States to abandon Israel. The nuclear secret agreement, the threat of the Samson Option, and the strategic dependence established after 1979 — Netanyahu understood better than anyone that these curses fundamentally constrained U.S. options. He maximised this structural advantage and continued to deflect American pressure.
In March 2010, during Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel, the Netanyahu government announced the construction of 1,600 settlement housing units in East Jerusalem. This was a clear diplomatic insult. Obama was furious and cancelled a meeting with Netanyahu. However, in the end, the United States did not reduce military aid to Israel. The aid amount for fiscal year 2010 remained at $3 billion, and the preferential provision of F-35 stealth fighters was actually promised. Netanyahu’s calculation was entirely correct.
Table 7-1: U.S. Military Aid to Israel During the Obama Administration (2009-2016, in billions of dollars)
| Year | Military Aid Amount | Major Weapons Provided | Special Notes |
| 2009 | 2.55 | Additional F-16, AH-64 helicopters | The Netanyahu government begins |
| 2010 | 2.775 | F-35 preferential provision contract | Settlement announcement incident during Biden visit |
| 2011 | 3.0 | Iron Dome joint development support begins | “Arab Spring” begins |
| 2012 | 3.1 | Additional Iron Dome deployment | Pillar of Defence operation |
| 2013 | 3.1 | V-22 Osprey provision contract | Syrian civil war intensifies |
| 2014 | 3.1 | Emergency ammunition resupply (Protective Edge operation) | Large-scale Gaza attack |
| 2015 | 3.1 | First F-35 delivery begins | Iran nuclear deal, Netanyahu’s congressional speech |
| 2016 | 3.1 | Additional precision-guided bombs provided | 10-year $38 billion agreement signed |
| Total | 24.025 | — | Annual average $3 billion |
7.2 The Iran Nuclear Deal and Netanyahu’s “Rebellion” — Speech to the U.S. Congress
In 2013, Obama began full-scale nuclear negotiations with Iran. The goal was to limit Iran’s nuclear development through diplomatic means and avoid military conflict in the Middle East. However, for Netanyahu, this was a nightmare scenario. If the United States and Iran reconciled, Israel’s strategic value would relatively decline. The structure established after 1979 of “Israel as the only reliable foothold” could collapse.
Netanyahu took unprecedented action to block the Iran nuclear deal. On March 3, 2015, at the invitation of Congress and without advance notice to Obama, he delivered a speech to the U.S. Congress. This was a serious violation of diplomatic protocol. Congressional speeches by foreign leaders are normally coordinated in advance with the White House. However, Netanyahu bypassed the Obama administration and appealed directly to the Republican-controlled Congress.
In his speech, Netanyahu vehemently condemned the Iran nuclear deal as a “historic mistake.” “This agreement opens the path to nuclear weapons for Iran. Iran seeks to dominate the Middle East and destroy Israel. The United States must not trust Iran.” Republican members of Congress greeted him with 29 standing ovations. Meanwhile, many Democratic members boycotted the speech. Netanyahu pursued his country’s interests even at the cost of dividing American domestic politics.
Obama was furious. “Netanyahu doesn’t understand the reality of the Middle East. He just criticises without offering alternatives.” However, Obama ultimately proceeded with the agreement with Iran, and in July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded. Netanyahu appeared to have been defeated. However, he never forgot this “humiliation.” Two years later, an opportunity for revenge would come.
Table 7-2: Major Confrontation Incidents in Obama-Netanyahu Relations (2009-2016)
| Date | Event | Obama Administration Position | Netanyahu Government Response | Outcome |
| May 2009 | First White House meeting | Demanded settlement freeze | Public refusal | Freeze not realised |
| March 2010 | Settlement announcement during Biden visit | Strong protest, meeting cancelled | No apology, construction continued | U.S. pressure neutralised |
| May 2011 | Obama proposes 1967 borders as basis | Promotes two-state solution | Immediately rejected as “indefensible” | Proposal effectively withdrawn |
| July-Aug 2014 | Protective Edge operation | Calls for ceasefire | Continued operation for 51 days | Ceasefire after 2,251 deaths |
| March 2015 | Netanyahu’s congressional speech | Condemned as “diplomatic protocol violation” | Attempted to block Iran nuclear deal | Agreement concluded |
| December 2016 | UN Security Council Resolution 2334 | U.S. did not exercise veto | Strongly condemned as “betrayal” | Illegal settlements resolution adopted |
7.3 Trump’s First Term — Birth of the “Perfect Alliance”
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th President of the United States. For Netanyahu, this was a godsend. Trump and Netanyahu had a high affinity both ideologically and personally. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, had a family relationship with Netanyahu and was in charge of Middle East policy at the White House.
The Trump administration provided unprecedented favours to Israel. In December 2017, Trump recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and declared the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. The international community unanimously opposed this, but Trump paid no heed. On May 14, 2018, the U.S. embassy was opened in Jerusalem. On that same day, Israeli forces fired on Palestinians participating in the “Great March of Return” in Gaza, killing 58 people. However, the Trump administration supported Israel’s “right to self-defence.”
In May 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and began a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran. This was Netanyahu’s long-held aspiration. Furthermore, in March 2019, Trump recognised Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. In January 2020, he announced the “Middle East Peace Plan (Deal of the Century),” but its content was almost entirely in line with Israel’s demands. The Palestinian Authority immediately rejected this “peace plan.”
During the four years of the Trump administration, U.S. policy toward Israel underwent a historic transformation. Previously, the United States had ostensibly presented itself as a “fair mediator” and adopted a formally balanced stance on the Palestinian issue. However, the Trump administration abandoned even this pretence and unconditionally supported Israel’s position. Netanyahu succeeded in completely winning over the U.S. President.
Table 7-3: Israel Support Policies of Trump’s First Administration (2017-2020)
| Date | Policy | International Reaction | Impact on Palestinians |
| Dec 2017 | Jerusalem recognised as capital | UN General Assembly condemnation resolution, 128 countries in favour | East Jerusalem annexation becomes a fait accompli |
| May 2018 | U.S. Embassy moved to Jerusalem | Arab countries strongly protest | Same day, 58 killed in Gaza “March of Return” |
| May 2018 | Withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal | European countries oppose | Iran-Israel confrontation intensifies |
| Aug 2018 | Suspension of contributions to UNRWA | UN Secretary-General expresses concern | Refugee support collapses, humanitarian crisis worsens |
| March 2019 | Recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights | The Arab League and the UN declare invalid | International recognition of the annexation of Syrian territory annexation |
| Nov 2019 | Stated West Bank settlements not violations of international law | EU and UN argue international law violation | Settlement expansion accelerates |
| Jan 2020 | Announced Middle East peace plan | Palestinian Authority immediately rejects | No Jerusalem division, refugee return rights denied |
| Aug-Sep 2020 | Abraham Accords (UAE, Bahrain normalisation) | Some Arab countries follow | Palestinian issue marginalised |
7.4 Biden Administration and Netanyahu’s Renewed Confrontation — Structure Remains Unchanged
On January 20, 2021, Joe Biden was inaugurated as the 46th President. Biden himself was known as pro-Israel, but from his experience as Vice President during the Obama administration, he had complex feelings about his relationship with Netanyahu. The Biden administration revised the Trump administration’s extreme pro-Israel policies and partially resumed dialogue with Palestinians.
However, Netanyahu was wary of the Biden administration’s policy shift. He particularly opposed Biden’s attempts to return to the Iran nuclear deal. In May 2021, Netanyahu conducted an 11-day “Guardian of the Walls” operation, attacking Gaza. 256 Palestinians were killed, including 66 children. The Biden administration called for a ceasefire, but Netanyahu continued the attack until the 11th day.
In November 2022, Netanyahu returned as Prime Minister through a coalition with far-right parties. This sixth Netanyahu government was the most right-wing government in Israeli history. Coalition partners included far-right politicians who openly advocated for the “transfer (expulsion)” of Palestinians. The Biden administration expressed concern, but military aid continued. Aid to Israel in fiscal year 2023 reached $3.8 billion, a record high.
Over 12 years, from 2009 to 2020, Netanyahu confronted three U.S. Presidents. He clashed intensely with Obama, enjoyed a honeymoon relationship with Trump, and resumed tensions with Biden. However, what remained consistent was the fact that no president could substantially constrain Netanyahu. The “three curses” continued to bind U.S. actions beyond the will of individual presidents. And this structure would directly lead to America’s powerlessness in the Gaza war after October 2023.
Table 7-4: Comparison of Three Administrations’ Relations with Netanyahu (2009-2020)
| Administration | Period | Nature of Relationship | Major Points of Conflict | Military Aid | Netanyahu’s Strategy |
| Obama | 2009-2016 | Tension/Confrontation | Settlements, Iran nuclear deal, two-state solution | An annual average $3 billion is maintained | Ignored pressure using “negative cross” as a shield |
| Trump | 2017-2020 | Honeymoon | No conflict (complete support) | Annual average increased to $3.8 billion | Complete capture of U.S. policy |
| Biden | 2021-2024 | Tension | Iran policy, settlements, far-right coalition | Annual average $3.8 billion maintained | Replay of Obama-era strategy |
Table 7-5: Major Events Timeline 2009-2020
| Date | Event | U.S. Response | Netanyahu Government Action | Strategic Significance |
| March 2009 | Netanyahu becomes PM (2nd term) | Tension with the Obama administration begins | Settlement expansion continues | The era of confrontation begins |
| May 2010 | Mavi Marmara incident (Gaza aid ship attack) | Supports international investigation committee | Blockade continues | 9 killed, international condemnation |
| Nov 2012 | Pillar of Defence operation | Mediates ceasefire | 167 killed in 8 days | Iron Dome combat deployment |
| July-Aug 2014 | Protective Edge operation | Calls for ceasefire | 2,251 killed in 51 days | Largest Gaza attack |
| March 2015 | Netanyahu’s U.S. congressional speech | Obama furious | Attempted to block Iran nuclear deal | Unprecedented diplomatic protocol violation |
| July 2015 | Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) concluded | Led by Obama | Strongly opposed | Netanyahu “defeated” |
| Jan 2017 | Trump inaugurated | Full pro-Israel policy deployment | Honeymoon begins | Strategic environment drastically changes |
| May 2018 | U.S. Embassy moved to Jerusalem | Trump executes | Praised as “historic victory” | International law violation becomes fait accompli |
| Aug 2020 | Abraham Accords | Trump mediates | Normalises with the UAE, Bahrain | Palestinian issue marginalised |
By the end of 2020, through 12 years as Prime Minister, Netanyahu had significantly strengthened Israel’s strategic position. In relations with the United States, he maximised the use of the “three curses” and continued to deflect pressure from U.S. Presidents. In the Middle East, through the Abraham Accords, he improved relations with Arab countries and succeeded in marginalising the Palestinian issue. Domestically, he deepened cooperation with far-right forces and intensified the oppression of Palestinians. All these elements were preparing the path to the catastrophe after October 2023.
Chapter 8: Acceleration Toward Destruction — Biden Administration Period (2021-January 2025) and Trump’s Second Term Begins (January 2025-), Gaza Annihilation, Netanyahu’s Predicament (2021-2025)
8.1 The Quagmire of Corruption Trials — Netanyahu’s Legal Predicament
On November 21, 2019, Israel’s Attorney General formally indicted incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on charges of corruption, fraud, and breach of trust. For the first time in Israeli history, a sitting Prime Minister was criminally prosecuted — an unprecedented situation. The indictment consisted of three cases (Case 1000, Case 2000, Case 4000).
Case 1000 (Bribery) alleged that Netanyahu and his wife, Sara, received gifts worth approximately 700,000 shekels (about 28 million yen) from wealthy businessmen Arnon Milchan and James Packer between 2007 and 2016. The gifts included luxury champagne, cigars, and jewellery. In return, Netanyahu allegedly facilitated Milchan’s business interests and supported his U.S. visa acquisition.
Case 2000 (Fraud) alleged that Netanyahu secretly negotiated with Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Moses to promote legislation restricting the circulation of rival newspaper Israel Hayom in exchange for favourable coverage in Yedioth Ahronoth. These negotiations were recorded, providing decisive evidence.
Case 4000 (Corruption, most serious) alleged that Netanyahu made regulatory decisions favourable to Bezeq telecommunications company, owned by Shaul Elovitch, in exchange for demanding favourable coverage of himself and his family on Elovitch-owned news site Walla. Hundreds of message records were submitted as evidence, revealing how Netanyahu and his aides tried to minutely manipulate media coverage.
If convicted on all charges, Netanyahu could face up to 10 years in prison. More importantly, a guilty verdict would cost him the prime ministership and completely end his political life. For Netanyahu, the prime ministership was not merely power but a shield of legal protection and political survival itself.
The trial began in May 2020, but Netanyahu claimed it was a “political witch hunt” and a “conspiracy by the left and media,” denying all charges. He employed every tactic to prolong the legal battle. Between 2021 and 2022, Israel held five elections in two years, driven by Netanyahu’s obsession with forming a coalition government that could politically nullify his trial.
Table 8-1: Details of Netanyahu’s Corruption Cases
| Case Name | Charges | Key Figures | Allegations | Maximum Sentence |
| Case 1000 | Bribery | Businessmen Arnon Milchan, James Packer | Received luxury items (champagne, cigars, jewellery) worth 700,000 shekels, provided business favours in return | 3 years |
| Case 2000 | Fraud | Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Moses | Demanded favourable coverage in exchange for rival newspaper regulation (recorded evidence) | 3 years |
| Case 4000 | Corruption/Breach of Trust | Bezeq owner Shaul Elovitch | Demanded favourable coverage on the news site Walla in exchange for regulatory preferential treatment (hundreds of message records) | 10 years |
| Total | — | — | — | Maximum 16 years |
8.2 Rift with Trump’s First Term — Non-participation in Soleimani Operation and Biden’s Congratulations
8.2.1 Non-participation in Soleimani Assassination Operation — The First Betrayal
At 1:00 AM on January 3, 2020, a drone strike occurred at Baghdad International Airport. The target was Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. Soleimani was one of the most important figures directing Iran’s military operations throughout the Middle East and was one of the greatest threats to both the United States and Israel. He supported Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, Syria’s Assad regime, and Yemen’s Houthis, serving as the executor of “Iran’s Middle Eastern dominance.”
The Trump administration had been preparing this assassination operation for weeks. They tracked Soleimani’s movements, obtained information about his Baghdad visit, and planned a precision attack using MQ-9 Reaper drones. For this operation, Trump approached Israel, his closest ally, about participation. For Israel, Soleimani was literally an archenemy, and his elimination was one of Israel’s top security priorities.
However, Netanyahu refused to directly participate in the operation. He feared that Israel’s open involvement in the U.S. operation would invite direct Iranian retaliation. Furthermore, he calculated the risk that if the operation failed, Israel would face international condemnation. Netanyahu is reported to have cooperated with the United States through information sharing, but did not participate in direct military action. The United States executed the operation alone and bore the responsibility alone.
On January 3, the operation succeeded, and Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraqi Shiite militia organisations, were killed. Trump touted this operation as a “decisive blow to Iranian terrorism.” However, Trump’s aides were strongly dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s refusal to participate. “We eliminated Israel’s greatest enemy. Yet they refused to get their hands dirty. Israel benefited the most.”
On January 8, Iran retaliated by launching missile attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq. Over 110 U.S. soldiers suffered injuries, including concussions. Only the United States bore the risks and sacrifices, while Israel enjoyed the benefits from a safe distance — this structure became a source of Trump’s dissatisfaction.
8.2.2 Biden Congratulations — The Decisive Betrayal
Just 10 months after the Soleimani operation, Trump’s dissatisfaction would turn to anger.
On November 7, 2020, U.S. media reported that Democrat Joe Biden had been elected. At this time, world leaders were cautious about offering congratulations, as they watched Trump’s legal battle. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and other major Western leaders waited several days.
However, Netanyahu sent Biden a congratulatory message just 12 hours later, on the morning of November 8, earlier than any other major country leader.
“Joe, Jill, congratulations. You and I have been friends for many years, and I have cherished the strong alliance with the United States and the friendship between our countries. I look forward to working with you.”
This message appeared as a double betrayal of Trump. First, Trump claimed the election was “stolen” and had not conceded defeat. Second, Netanyahu, supposedly his closest ally, being the first to congratulate Biden, showed a lack of personal loyalty to Trump.
Even more humiliating was the video message Netanyahu released at the same time. In it, Netanyahu emphasised his “longtime friendship” since Biden’s vice presidency, with mention of Trump added only formally at the end: “I also thank President Trump for his friendship.” Clearly, Netanyahu prioritised relations with the next administration and abandoned Trump.
According to testimony from Trump aides, Trump was furious when he saw this news and shouted, “That bastard (Bibi) was the first to congratulate him after everything I did for him. I took out Soleimani for him, but he wouldn’t get his hands dirty. And now, when I’m at my most difficult moment, he’s the first to wag his tail at Biden.”
Trump had provided Netanyahu with unprecedented favours. The 2017 Jerusalem capital recognition, 2018 U.S. embassy relocation to Jerusalem, 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and 2020 Abraham Accords mediation — all were “gifts” that Trump realised by pushing aside international opposition. Nevertheless, Netanyahu politically “backed the winning horse.”
In December 2021, after leaving office, Trump called Netanyahu a “disloyal guy” in a conservative media interview and stated:
“I did more for Israel than any president. Jerusalem, Golan, Iran nuclear deal withdrawal — I did it all. Yet he congratulated Biden first, faster than anyone. He abandoned me while I was still fighting. Fuck him. He betrayed me.”
This public condemnation showed that their relationship had deteriorated decisively. Furthermore, Trump criticised Netanyahu in his 2023 autobiographical work, writing, “Once I lost the election, he immediately forgot me. He’s a man who discards friends who have lost their usefulness.”
Table 8-2: Trump First Administration’s Israel Support vs. Netanyahu’s “Betrayal” Comparison
| Date | Trump’s Support | Netanyahu’s Response | Trump Side’s Expectation | Actual Result |
| Dec 2017 | Jerusalem capital recognition | Praised as “historic victory” | Unconditional loyalty | Benefit enjoyment only |
| May 2018 | Iran nuclear deal withdrawal | Praised as longtime aspiration achieved | Iran problem cooperation | Operation cooperation refused |
| March 2019 | Golan Heights sovereignty recognition | Proposed naming “Trump Heights” | Continued political support | Immediately abandoned after election |
| Jan 2020 | Soleimani assassination operation | Refused direct participation | Joint operation execution | Information provision only, U.S. bore risks alone |
| Aug 2020 | Abraham Accords mediation | Contributed to Netanyahu’s election victory | Election support | — |
| Nov 2020 | Trump defeat (contested) | Immediately congratulated Biden | Minimum silence | World’s fastest “betrayal” |
8.3 Judicial Reform and Israeli Domestic Division — A Gamble for Survival
In November 2022, Netanyahu returned as Prime Minister after a fifth election. However, this sixth Netanyahu government was the most fragile and most dangerous government in Israeli history. His political life literally stood on a cliff-edge due to corruption trials.
To escape this predicament, Netanyahu chose coalition with far-right parties. He gave cabinet positions to far-right politicians like Bezalel Smotrich (Finance Minister and Minister for West Bank Affairs, Religious Zionism party) and Itamar Ben-Gvir (National Security Minister, Jewish Power party). These were individuals who openly advocated for the “transfer (expulsion)” of Palestinians and prioritised West Bank settlement expansion. Ben-Gvir had been a member of the far-right terrorist organisation Kach and supported a group designated as a terrorist organisation by the U.S. State Department.
On January 4, 2023, the Netanyahu government announced a “judicial reform” proposal. Ostensibly promoting “strengthening democracy” and “stopping elite judicial overreach,” it substantively weakened the Supreme Court’s authority and absolutised Knesset (parliament) power. The main elements were: (1) effective elimination of the Supreme Court’s power to declare laws unconstitutional, (2) political appointment of ministers’ legal advisors, and (3) strengthened political intervention in the judicial appointment committee. If this reform were realised, Netanyahu’s own corruption trial could potentially be politically nullified by parliamentary decision.
Against this judicial reform proposal, the largest protest movement in Israeli history erupted domestically. Every Saturday, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa, shouting “Defend democracy” and “Oppose dictatorship.” At the March 2023 peak, over 500,000 people participated in protests in a single day (over 5% of Israel’s total population of about 9.6 million). Some reserve air force pilots and special forces members declared they would not respond to reserve call-ups if judicial reform was implemented. Former IDF Chiefs of Staff and former heads of intelligence agencies Mossad and Shin Bet issued an unprecedented warning: “This reform endangers national security. It destroys military unity.”
Israeli society was severely divided. Secular and liberal sectors opposed the reform as “the end of democracy,” while religious conservatives and far-right supporters supported it as a “popular rebellion against the elite judiciary.” The business community also expressed concern, with high-tech company executives opposing it, stating “loss of judicial independence will destroy the investment environment.” Indeed, in the first half of 2023, foreign investment declined sharply, and the shekel depreciated.
However, Netanyahu tried to force through the reform. For him, judicial reform was the only path to political survival. On July 24, 2023, the first stage of legislation restricting Supreme Court authority (exemption from applying “reasonableness standard”) passed the Knesset 64-0 (opposition boycotted the vote). Israeli society’s division had reached an irreparable stage. This internal division and declining military morale would create the conditions for the catastrophe of October 7, just two and a half months later.
Table 8-3: Key Cabinet Members of Netanyahu’s Sixth Government (December 2022-)
| Cabinet Member | Party | Position | Political Position/Background |
| Benjamin Netanyahu | Likud | Prime Minister | Indicted for corruption, fraud, breach of trust; attempting to nullify trial through judicial reform |
| Bezalel Smotrich | Religious Zionism | Finance Minister, Minister for West Bank | Promotes settlement expansion, stated “Palestinians don’t exist,” opposes Palestinian state |
| Itamar Ben-Gvir | Jewish Power | National Security Minister | Advocates Palestinian “transfer,” past support for terrorist organization Kach, 27 arrest records |
| Yoav Gallant | Likud | Defense Minister | Briefly opposed judicial reform → Netanyahu announced dismissal → mass protests led to reversal |
| Eli Cohen | Likud | Foreign Minister | Netanyahu confidant |
| Yariv Levin | Likud | Justice Minister | Key drafter and promoter of judicial reform |
8.4 October 7, 2023 — Hamas Attack and Israel’s “Intelligence Failure”
At 6:30 AM on October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel from Gaza. Thousands of rockets were fired at southern Israel, while approximately 3,000 Hamas fighters breached the Gaza border fence and entered Israeli territory. They attacked settlements and military bases near the border, indiscriminately killing civilians. At a music festival venue, over 260 young people were massacred. Ultimately, this attack killed approximately 1,200 Israelis, and about 240 were taken hostage in Gaza.
This attack was the worst intelligence failure in Israeli history. Israel had world-class intelligence agencies, Mossad and Shin Bet, along with the most advanced surveillance technology. The Gaza border was equipped with sensors, surveillance cameras, and automated gun turrets, supposedly “the most heavily guarded border in the world.” Nevertheless, they failed to detect Hamas’s large-scale attack preparations in advance.
Subsequent investigations revealed astonishing facts. Israeli intelligence agencies had actually received warning information weeks before the attack. Egyptian intelligence warned in late September that “Hamas is preparing a large-scale operation.” Within the Israeli military, female surveillance soldiers reported abnormal movements near the Gaza border (increased training, material accumulation). However, all these warnings were ignored.
Why? Netanyahu and the military leadership were absorbed in the domestic political crisis over judicial reform and underestimated the threat from Gaza. Furthermore, Netanyahu had long adopted the strategy that “allowing Hamas to survive is the best way to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” He intentionally did not weaken Hamas, maintaining the division with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank. There is a record of Netanyahu stating at a 2019 Likud party meeting that “supporting Hamas is part of the strategy to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” This strategy led to the tragedy of October 7.
Table 8-4: Damage from Hamas Attack on October 7, 2023
| Item | Numbers | Details |
| Israeli deaths | Approx. 1,200 | Including approx. 800 civilians, approx. 400 soldiers |
| Hostages | Approx. 240 | Taken to Gaza, as of May 2025 some released, some confirmed dead |
| Injured | Approx. 5,400 | — |
| Attack methods | Thousands of rockets + ground incursion | Border fence breach, paraglider infiltration, maritime infiltration |
| Major attack sites | Music festival, Kibbutz settlements, military bases | Over 260 massacred at Re’im music festival |
| Advance warnings | Egyptian intelligence, military surveillance soldiers | All ignored |
8.5 Gaza Annihilation Operation — Mass Killing in the Name of “Self-Defense”
Hours after the October 7 attack, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared, “We are in a state of war.” On October 9, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant ordered a complete siege of Gaza, stating, “We are fighting human animals, and we are acting accordingly. No electricity, no food, no fuel. Everything is closed.” This was a clear declaration of collective punishment against 2.3 million civilians.
On October 27, Israeli ground forces invaded Gaza. The official objective of the operation was “destruction of Hamas and hostage rescue.” However, the actual operation escalated into systematic destruction of all of Gaza. The Israeli Air Force conducted the most intensive bombing since World War II against northern Gaza. The total tonnage of bombs dropped in two months reached an estimated 29,000 tons (equivalent to approximately twice the explosive power of the Hiroshima atomic bomb).
Hospitals, schools, mosques, residential areas — every structure became a target. Israel claimed these facilities were “used as Hamas military bases,” but evidence was scarce. Even UN-run shelters were attacked, killing civilians who had taken refuge there. By January 2024, over 60% of Gaza’s housing had been destroyed or damaged. Of 2.3 million residents, over 1.9 million were forced to evacuate and became refugees.
The medical system completely collapsed. Gaza had 36 hospitals, but by March 2024, only a few remained functional. Medicines, anesthetics, and surgical instruments were depleted, forcing doctors to perform surgery without anesthesia. Images of children with amputated limbs spread worldwide.
Starvation was also systematically used. Israel severely restricted the entry of food, water, and fuel into Gaza. In February 2024, the UN warned that “famine is imminent in northern Gaza.” Children began dying from malnutrition. In May 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor requested arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant for “using starvation as a means of warfare.”
Table 8-5: Gaza War Damage Statistics (October 7, 2023 – May 19, 2025 ceasefire)
| Item | Numbers | Notes |
| Palestinian deaths | Over 51,000 | Including approx. 17,000 children, approx. 11,000 women |
| Injured | Over 103,000 | Accurate statistics difficult due to medical system collapse |
| Missing | Approx. 10,000 | Estimated under rubble |
| Displaced persons | Over 1.9 million | Approx. 85% of Gaza’s population |
| Housing destruction | 60-70% destroyed/damaged | Approx. 370,000 units |
| Hospital cessation | 32 of 36 facilities | Medical collapse |
| School/university destruction | Almost all damaged | Education system collapse |
| Infrastructure destruction | Power, water, sewage almost completely destroyed | Public health crisis |
| Total bomb tonnage dropped | Estimated over 70,000 tons | Approx. twice the explosive power of Hiroshima bomb |
8.6 U.S. Silence and Repeated Veto Use — Complete Manifestation of the Burden
From the start of the Gaza war, the international community immediately called for a ceasefire. At the UN Security Council, ceasefire resolution proposals were repeatedly submitted. However, the United States exercised its veto against these resolutions.
On October 18, 2023, the United States vetoed a resolution calling for a “humanitarian ceasefire” submitted by Brazil. On October 25, the United States vetoed a ceasefire resolution submitted by Russia. On December 8, a ceasefire resolution led by the UAE was also blocked by a U.S. veto. On February 20, 2024, the United States vetoed an immediate ceasefire resolution submitted by Algeria.
In official statements, President Biden said “civilian casualties should be minimised” and called on Netanyahu for “restraint.” However, actual actions were unlimited support for Israel. Between October 2023 and December 2024, the United States provided over $18 billion in military aid to Israel. Precision-guided bombs, artillery shells, and fighter jet fuel — weapons used in the Gaza massacre were continuously supplied by the United States.
In Congress, some Democratic members argued that military aid to Israel should be conditional. However, Biden stated that “Israel’s security is non-negotiable” and continued unconditional support. Some State Department officials resigned over “complicity in genocide.” However, the Biden administration’s policy did not change.
This U.S. stance showed that the “three curses” were functioning completely. The nuclear secret agreement, the Samson Option, and strategic dependence since 1979 — these curses completely bound U.S. actions even in the face of over 50,000 deaths. Biden himself had been humiliated by Netanyahu in 2010 and personally disliked Netanyahu. However, as president, he could not escape structural constraints.
Table 8-6: Gaza Ceasefire Resolutions at UN Security Council and U.S. Vetoes (October 2023-December 2024)
| Date | Proposer | Resolution Content | U.S. Response | Voting Result |
| Oct 18, 2023 | Brazil | Humanitarian ceasefire | Veto exercised | For 12, Against 1 (US), Abstain 2 |
| Oct 25, 2023 | Russia | Immediate ceasefire | Veto exercised | For 4, Against 1 (US), Abstain 10 |
| Dec 8, 2023 | UAE | Immediate humanitarian ceasefire | Veto exercised | For 13, Against 1 (US), Abstain 1 (UK) |
| Feb 20, 2024 | Algeria | Immediate ceasefire | Veto exercised | For 13, Against 1 (US), Abstain 1 (UK) |
| March 25, 2024 | Elected Council Members | Immediate ceasefire (Ramadan period) | U.S. abstention (first time) | For 14, Against 0, Abstain 1 (US) |
| Nov 20, 2024 | Multiple countries | Immediate unconditional ceasefire | Veto exercised | For 14, Against 1 (US) |
8.7 Trump’s Second Term and Netanyahu’s Predicament — Cooling Relations and Pressure
On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 47th President. Netanyahu appeared to have gained Trump, the “perfect ally,” once again. However, the situation was fundamentally different from the first term in 2017.
First, Trump himself harboured deep distrust toward Netanyahu. The “double betrayal” of non-participation in the Soleimani operation and Biden congratulations was deeply etched in Trump’s memory. The day after the inauguration, Trump stated in an interview, “I’ll talk to Bibi, but I haven’t forgotten what he did to me.”
Second, Israel’s fiscal situation was critical. Nineteen months of war had dealt a devastating blow to the Israeli economy. War costs reached about $5 billion per month, with cumulative war costs from October 2023 exceeding $100 billion. This represented about 20% of Israel’s GDP (approximately $500 billion). Reserve mobilisation removed about 10% of the workforce from economic activity, and productivity plummeted. International rating agencies successively downgraded Israel’s credit rating. In March 2025, Moody’s downgraded Israel’s rating from “investment grade” to “junk (speculative).”
Third, international isolation had become severe. In May 2024, the ICC prosecutor requested arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant. In July of that year, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that Israel’s occupation policies violated international law. Many European countries downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel, and some implemented arms embargoes. The lawsuit filed by South Africa for “Genocide Convention violations” also continued at the ICJ.
Fourth, criticism of Netanyahu exploded within Israel. Responsibility for the October 7 intelligence failure, failure to rescue hostages, and prolongation of the war — all were directed at Netanyahu. Opinion polls showed Netanyahu’s approval rating had fallen to the 20s, with over 70% responding that he “should resign after the war.” However, Netanyahu clung to power because resigning would likely result in conviction in corruption trials. He tried to ensure political survival by continuing the war.
Trump’s second administration began pressuring Netanyahu. Trump had declared in his January inauguration speech to “end the era of endless wars.” In February, Trump reportedly told Netanyahu by phone, “End the war quickly. If it continues, the U.S. will be dragged in. I don’t intend to waste my presidential term on Middle Eastern wars.” Furthermore, Trump reportedly added, “You betrayed me. That’s why you need to listen to me this time.”
However, Netanyahu continued to prolong the ceasefire negotiations. For him, ending the war meant the end of his political life. When the war ended, domestic accountability would begin, and corruption trials would resume. Netanyahu tried to continue the war for self-preservation.
Table 8-7: Israel’s Fiscal and Economic Crisis Indicators (2023-2025)
| Indicator | Pre-war (Sept 2023) | War period (March 2025) | Change |
| Cumulative war costs | — | Approx. $100 billion | 20% of GDP |
| Monthly war costs | — | Approx. $5 billion | — |
| GDP growth rate | +2.5% | -3.0% (2024) | -5.5 points |
| Unemployment rate | 3.5% | 8.2% | +4.7 points |
| Credit rating (Moody’s) | A1 | Ba1 (junk) | Loss of investment grade |
| Fiscal deficit | 2.3% of GDP | 6.8% of GDP | +4.5 points |
| Foreign exchange reserves | $210 billion | $175 billion | -$35 billion (-17%) |
| Tourism revenue | $1 billion/month | Nearly zero | -100% |
| Netanyahu approval rating | Approx. 35% | Approx. 22% | -13 points |
Table 8-8: Major Events Timeline 2021-2025
| Date | Event | U.S. Response | Netanyahu Government Action | Strategic Significance |
| Jan 2020 | Soleimani assassination operation | Trump executes alone | Refused direct participation, information only | Seed of Trump’s discontent |
| Nov 2020 | Biden election confirmed | Trump continues contesting | Immediately congratulated Biden | Trump furious, relationship breaks |
| Jan 2021 | Biden inaugurated | Partially resumed Palestinian dialogue | Wary stance | Tension resumes |
| May 2021 | Guardian of the Walls operation | Calls for ceasefire | 256 killed in 11 days | Biden pressure limited |
| Nov 2022 | Netanyahu’s sixth government begins | Expressed concern about far-right coalition | Appointed far-right ministers | Most right-wing government in history |
| Jan-July 2023 | Judicial reform forced through | Expressed concern but no intervention | Ignored large-scale domestic protests | Israeli society divided |
| Oct 7, 2023 | Large-scale Hamas attack | Full support for Israeli self-defense | Declared “state of war” | 1,200 dead, 240 hostages |
| Oct 27, 2023 | Gaza ground invasion begins | Sharply increased military aid | Complete siege, bombing begins | Systematic destruction begins |
| Oct 2023-Dec 2024 | Consecutive UN ceasefire resolution vetoes | 5 vetoes exercised | Operation continued | “Negative cross” fully manifested |
| May 2024 | ICC arrest warrant request | Criticised ICC, defended Israel | Condemned as “antisemitism” | International isolation deepens |
| Dec 2024 | Deaths exceed 50,000 | Calls for ceasefire, continue aid | Operation continues | Humanitarian crisis reaches extreme |
| Jan 2025 | Trump’s second term begins | Demands “war termination,” mentions past grievances | Prolongs negotiations | Netanyahu’s predicament deepens |
| May 19, 2025 | Ceasefire agreement | Trump mediation | Reluctantly accepts | 19-month war ends |
On October 10, 2025, a new ceasefire took effect, mediated by the Trump administration. However, by that time, Gaza was annihilated. Over 67,075 were dead, 169,430 injured, urban functions completely destroyed, and about 1.9 million (90% of the population) became internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, Netanyahu remained in power as Prime Minister despite ongoing corruption trials in three cases and an ICC arrest warrant issued against him.
The war he chose to maintain power brought fiscal collapse and international isolation to Israel, and carved into the United States the historic stain of “complicity in genocide.” The “three curses” completely paralysed the United States, unable to stop over 50,000 deaths. This was the heaviest moment of the burden that began in 1979.
Chapter 9: The Persistence of Geopolitical Structure and the Path to “Lighten the Burden” (2025)
As of October 22, 2025, Israel faces a severe crisis. The Gaza war has continued for over two years, with 68,229 deaths, international isolation, fiscal crisis, and accelerating domestic division. However, this chapter does not ask about Netanyahu’s personal political fate. The question is whether the geopolitical structure established in 1979 remains valid, and whether there is a path to lighten the burden that the United States bears.
9.1 Three Divisions Within Israel — Deepening Fragmentation
In 2025, Israel is torn apart by three severe social divisions. This fragmentation was temporarily concealed by the Gaza war but has surfaced with the war’s prolongation, bringing a crisis of social integration.
Political Division: Left/Center vs. Right/Far-Right
The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) September 2025 poll reveals profound contradictions in the Israeli public. Ceasefire support reached 66%, a 13-point increase from the previous year. Netanyahu’s disapproval rate is 64%, with resignation demands also at 64%. However, simultaneously, opposition to Palestinian statehood reached 75%, an 11-point increase from the previous year. The public wants the war to end but refuses the concessions that would entail. This contradictory public opinion has rendered Israeli politics dysfunctional.
Political forces are clearly divided. Centrists Benny Gantz (National Unity party leader, former Defence Minister, former IDF Chief of Staff) and Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid party leader, former Prime Minister) advocate ceasefire negotiations and the repair of relations with the international community. October 2025 polls show Gantz’s approval at 35-40%, Lapid at 25-30%. In contrast, far-right Itamar Ben-Gvir (National Security Minister, Jewish Power party) and Bezalel Smotrich (Finance Minister, Religious Zionism party) advocate complete annexation of the West Bank and Gaza reoccupation. Combined support for both parties maintains 20-25%, with far-right influence remaining strong.
Religious Division: Secular vs. Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox)
Haredi (ultra-orthodox Jews), comprising 13% of Israel’s population, occupy a privileged position of military service exemption and government subsidy dependence. Secular Israelis’ dissatisfaction has reached a critical point. While 1,152 Israeli soldiers died in the Gaza war, almost all Haredi men were exempted from military service. According to Times of Israel reporting in January 2025, the Haredi population is growing at 4% annually and is predicted to reach 16% by 2030 and 30% by 2050. However, Haredi male employment rate is only about 50%, with many devoted to Torah study and dependent on government subsidies.
This structure is economically unsustainable. While the secular pay taxes and serve in the military, the Haredi population rapidly increases, raising the fiscal burden. In June 2024, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled Haredi military service exemption unconstitutional, but the Netanyahu government ignored the ruling. This issue questions the fundamental fairness and sustainability of Israeli society.
Ethnic Division: Jews vs. Arab Citizens
Arab citizens, comprising 21% of Israel’s population, formally have equal citizenship but are substantively treated as second-class citizens. The Gaza war decisively deepened this division. According to Al Jazeera reporting in March 2025, since the war began, surveillance of Arab citizens has intensified, with multiple cases of participants in Gaza support activities arrested on “terrorism support” charges.
Israel defines itself as both a “Jewish state and democratic state,” but these two principles are inherently contradictory. The mass civilian deaths in the Gaza war fundamentally shook Israel’s “democratic state” image internationally. Arab citizens’ sense of alienation and distrust has reached an all-time high.
Table 9-1: Indicators of Israeli Domestic Division (2025)
| Axis of Division | Main Conflict | Numerical Indicators | Source |
| Political division | Ceasefire support vs. war continuation | 66% support ceasefire, 75% oppose Palestinian state | IDI Sept 2025 |
| Political division | Netanyahu support vs. opposition | 64% disapproval, 77% military trust vs. 46% Netanyahu | IDI Aug 2025 |
| Religious division | Secular vs. Haredi | Haredi 13% → 30% projected by 2050, 95%+ exemption rate | Times of Israel Jan 2025 |
| Religious division | Economic burden | Haredi male employment approx. 50%, government subsidy dependent | Times of Israel Jan 2025 |
| Ethnic division | Jews vs. Arabs | Arab 21% of population, increased surveillance/arrests after Gaza war | Al Jazeera March 2025 |
9.2 Is the 1979 Geopolitical Structure Still Valid? — Israel as an “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier”
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1979 Iranian Revolution fundamentally changed Middle Eastern geopolitics. The United States lost all reliable allies except Israel in the vast region from the Persian Gulf to the Levant. This structure remains unchanged in 2025.
Israel’s Strategic Value: Five Elements
First, it is the Middle East’s only nuclear power. According to the Arms Control Association’s 2025 estimate, Israel possesses 90 nuclear warheads. This nuclear capability functions as the ultimate deterrent against Iranian nuclear development.
Second, it has the region’s strongest military force. In the Global Firepower 2025 ranking, Israel ranks 15th globally, surpassing Iran (16th). Despite being a small country with a population of 9.3 million, this military force is decisive in the Middle Eastern power balance.
Third, it is formally a democratic state. With parliamentary democracy, rule of law, and an independent judiciary, Israel is considered the Middle East’s only “Western-style democracy.” This political system has been an important basis for justifying Israeli support in U.S. domestic politics. The Gaza war damaged this reputation, but lacking alternatives, the United States must continue to rely on this logic.
Fourth, it is the anti-Iran frontline. The frontline of military and intelligence opposition to Iranian nuclear development, Hezbollah support, and Yemen Houthi support is Israel. As long as the United States maintains an Iran containment strategy, Israel’s role is indispensable.
Fifth, it functions as a Living Laboratory. As detailed in Chapter 6, Israel’s defense industry dominates world markets with real combat data. Annual exports exceed $13 billion, leading globally in counter-terrorism, cyber, and drone technology. The U.S. Department of Defence also depends on Israeli technology, and this economic and technological interdependence strengthens the alliance.
Absence of Alternatives
Egypt has a population exceeding 100 million but is a military dictatorship suffering from economic crisis. Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with political instability and limited military capability. Jordan is a fragile kingdom economically dependent on the United States, with 60% of its population Palestinian, harboring internal instability. The UAE is a small country with limited defence capability and a small regional influence.
No country in the Middle East except Israel satisfies all five conditions: nuclear possession, the strongest regional military force, a democratic system, an anti-Iran frontline, and technological advancement. This geopolitical reality has bound the United States to the “negative cross” since 1979.
Table 9-2: Strategic Comparison of Major Middle Eastern Countries (2025)
| Country | Nuclear Weapons | Military Rank | Political System | Relations with US | Strategic Constraints |
| Israel | 90 warheads | World 15th | Democratic (formally) | Strongest alliance | International isolation, fiscal crisis |
| Egypt | None | World 14th | Military dictatorship | Ally | Economic crisis, 100M+ population governance difficulty |
| Saudi Arabia | None | World 23rd | Absolute monarchy | Ally | Political instability, limited military |
| Jordan | None | World 69th | Monarchy | Ally | Fragile, 60% Palestinian population |
| UAE | None | World 39th | Absolute monarchy | Ally | Small country, limited defense capability |
| Iran | None (developing) | World 16th | Theocracy | Adversary | Primary U.S. adversary |
9.3 Abraham Accords and Attempts to Reconstruct Regional Balance
On September 15, 2020, Trump’s first administration realized the historic Abraham Accords. Israel normalised relations with the UAE and Bahrain, followed by Morocco in December 2020 and Sudan in January 2021. The strategic intent of this agreement was a transformation of U.S. geopolitical structure from “sole dependence on Israel to balance across the entire Middle East region.”
Abraham Accords Achievements
In the five years from 2020 to 2025, trade volume between Israel and the UAE reached $3 billion annually. Tourism, technological cooperation, and financial transactions expanded rapidly. Relations with Bahrain also deepened, mainly in the security and intelligence fields. These are not merely diplomatic ceremonies but the beginning of substantive economic integration.
However, the Abraham Accords had a decisive limitation: the most important aspect of Saudi Arabia’s participation has not been realised. Just before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, U.S.-Saudi Arabia-Israel trilateral Saudi normalisation negotiations were in the final stages. However, everything was frozen with the outbreak of the Gaza war.
Trump’s Second Administration Strategy
Trump’s second administration, inaugurated January 20, 2025, has positioned Abraham Accords expansion as the top diplomatic priority. According to Reuters reporting on October 17, 2025, President Trump stated, “Saudi Arabia is ready to join the agreement.” However, obstacles are clear. Saudi Arabia demands a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood as a condition for normalisation. Netanyahu’s far-right government, with its West Bank annexation orientation, cannot accept this condition.
The strategic intent of the Abraham Accords expansion is to distribute America’s “cross” across the entire region. Transform Israel from an “isolated nuclear power” to a “regionally integrated state,” and reduce U.S. sole dependence on Israel through strengthened relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan. If realised, Israel’s positioning would change from “the only strategic foothold” to “one of the major footholds,” and U.S. diplomatic freedom would recover.
Table 9-3: Abraham Accords Timeline and Current Status (2020-2025)
| Date | Event | Substantive Results | Constraints/Challenges |
| Sept 15, 2020 | UAE, Bahrain normalisation | Trade $3B annually, tourism/tech cooperation | Relationship cooled with Gaza war |
| Dec 2020 | Morocco normalization | Security/intelligence cooperation | Limited |
| Jan 2021 | Sudan normalization | Political symbolism only | Substantively halted with Sudan civil war |
| Oct 7, 2023 | Saudi negotiations at final stage interrupted | — | Frozen with Hamas attack and Gaza war |
| Oct 2025 | Trump 2nd term, announces Saudi negotiations resumption | Negotiation stage | Palestinian issue is obstacle |
9.4 Two Normalisations — The Possibility of “Lightening the Burden”
Two normalisations are discussed as paths to lighten the burden the United States bears. The first normalisation is Middle East regional balance reconstruction; the second is Israeli regime transformation.
First Normalisation: Regional Balance Reconstruction Concept
A concept to integrate Israel into the Middle East region through Abraham Accords expansion. Saudi participation is key. If Saudi normalizes, Qatar (already in unofficial contact with Israel), Kuwait, Oman, Indonesia, and other Islamic countries may follow.
Regarding Iran containment, the possibility is noted that cooperation among Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan could create regional power balance superior to Iran.
Second Normalisation: Possibility of Israeli Regime Change
Transition from a far-right coalition government to a moderate/centrist government is expected by some. If a coalition government with Benny Gantz or Yair Lapid as Prime Minister is formed, the assumption is that West Bank annexation abandonment, Gaza reconstruction cooperation, and realistic approaches to the Palestinian issue become possible.
However, as of October 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu remains in office, with the timing and method of regime change uncertain. Even if a moderate government is formed, the reality that 75% of public opinion opposes Palestinian statehood remains unchanged. What a moderate government could actually accomplish is unknown.
Theoretical Effects if Both Normalizations Are Realized
Theoretically, if both regional balance and Israeli regime transform, the following effects are anticipated:
For the United States: regional-wide risk distribution, reduced Israel dependence, fiscal cost reduction, reduced UN Security Council veto use, international credibility recovery (especially Democratic supporters and youth).
For Israel: expanded economic benefits through regional integration, escape from international isolation, possibility of social integration recovery (secular-Haredi conflict mitigation, Jew-Arab citizen division mitigation).
For Palestinians, the two-state solution remains a distant goal, but hope emerges for at least stopping the current worsening, Gaza reconstruction, and guaranteeing minimum humanitarian living standards.
Major Obstacles
Saudi normalisation faces the Palestinian issue as an obstacle. 75% of Israeli public opinion opposes Palestinian statehood. Even if a moderate government emerges, changing this public opinion is extremely difficult. Far-right forces (Ben-Gvir, Smotrich) maintain 20-25% support, with strong settler movement and religious right organisational power. The Iran problem also continues.
Table 9-4: Theoretical Effects and Obstacles of Two Normalisations
| Type of Normalisation | Specific Content | Expected Effects (Theory) | Major Obstacles |
| First: Regional balance | Abraham Accords expansion, Saudi participation | Israel regional integration, U.S. cost distribution, power balance advantage over Iran | Palestinian issue, Gaza war memory, Iraq/Syria/Qatar are pro-Iran |
| Second: Regime change | Moderate government (Gantz/Lapid), far-right exclusion (hypothetical) | Ceasefire compliance, respect international law, possible U.S. trust recovery | 75% public opinion opposes Palestinian state, far-right maintains 20-25%, realization unknown |
| Both realized | Regional integration + moderate government (ideal) | Possibility of lightening U.S. “cross” | Long-term process (5-10 years), many uncertainties |
9.5 The 1979 Decision — Final Paragraph
In 1979, the United States faced the nightmare of losing Iran. At that moment, it chose the nuclear-armed state of Israel as its strategic foothold. The three curses of the nuclear secret agreement, Samson Option, and strategic dependence inevitably arose from that choice. From the moment of that decision, this burden was structurally unavoidable.
Netanyahu is the person who made this burden heaviest. He knew well the structural constraints that prevent the United States from saying “No” and exploited them maximally. He continued the war to escape corruption trials, refused ceasefire to maintain far-right coalition, and took the alliance hostage for personal political survival.
As detailed in Chapter 8, relations with Trump’s second administration have already deteriorated. Netanyahu understands he will receive some sanction or treatment from Trump. But here is the paradox: if he immediately complies with Trump’s demand to “stop the war immediately,” Netanyahu would show weakness, and subsequent treatment would be greater.
Netanyahu’s calculation is cold-blooded. By prolonging the war as much as possible and using the far-right coalition to continue refusing a ceasefire, the United States must continue exercising its veto at the UN Security Council. The more the United States becomes Israel’s “accomplice,” the more Trump will ultimately have to compromise. Prolonging to the very limit and maintaining bravado until a mutual compromise point is found is the most advantageous strategy for Netanyahu facing corruption trials.
The greater the fear, the more bravado to not be seen as weak. The longer the war is extended, the more deeply the United States is involved, and the conditions of final compromise become more favourable to Netanyahu. This is Netanyahu’s calculation and the reason he made the burden heaviest.
However, the geopolitical structure does not change. Iran’s hostile threat continues to evolve, and the Middle East remains unstable. The United States cannot lay down this burden.
The challenge is clear. Explore the possibility of lightening the burden through two normalisations. Building Middle East regional geopolitical balance. Israeli regime transformation and regional stabilisation through deterrence. If these two are realized, America’s burden may become lighter, simultaneously opening a path for Israel to escape isolation and possibly creating hope for Palestinians.
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