Analysis baseline: approximately March 5, 2026. Events after this date are not reflected.

Chapter Index

Chapter	Title
Prologue	What Happened on February 28, 2026
Ch. 1	The Path from Nuclear Talks to Military Action and the Structure of Justification
Ch. 2	How Past Limited Retaliation Enabled the Decision to Assassinate the Supreme Leader
Ch. 3	The 58-Day Force Redeployment from Venezuela to Iran
Ch. 4	Post-Assassination Power Structure Revealed by Persian-Language Primary Sources
Ch. 5	The Military Meaning of Five Simultaneous Kills and the Reality of Successor Placement
Ch. 6	Six-Stage Evaluation of the Intelligence Process That Made the Assassination Possible
Ch. 7	Quantifying Iran’s Remaining Military Capability by Region and Domain
Ch. 8	Verifying Wartime Fiscal Sustainability from Iran’s Actual Government Budget Figures
Ch. 9	Verifying All of Iran’s Access Routes Beyond Hormuz with Actual Data
Ch. 10	The CIA’s Pre-Assessment and Five Scenarios for ‘After the Destruction’
Epilogue	What This Attack Designed, What It Achieved, and What It Has Not

Chapter 4: Post-Assassination Power Structure Revealed by Persian-Language Primary Sources

── The Distribution of ‘Announcement Authority = Real Authority’ and the Reconstruction of the Polycentric Structure That English Media Missed

1. The Single Line ‘Interim Council Formed’ Tells Us Nothing

Hours after Khamenei’s assassination, English-language media uniformly reported that ‘Iran’s interim leadership council has been formed’ [4-01]. Reuters, BBC, and Al Jazeera all conveyed that a three-member body under Article 111 of the constitution — the President, the Judiciary Chief, and a Guardian Council jurist — had assumed interim authority. This reporting is factually accurate.

However, this single line explains nothing. The question is not ‘that a council was formed’ but who said what, through which outlet, and in what order. At the moment a nation’s supreme authority becomes vacant, the person who first stands before the cameras, the person who first cites a constitutional article number, the person who first utters the word ‘retaliation’ — each differs, and that distribution maps the power structure.

English media does not capture this distribution. Only by descending into Persian-language primary sources can the three-dimensional picture of ‘who, what, through which outlet’ become visible. This chapter tracks Khabaronline, Jamaran, Fararu, and Eghtesadnews at the word level, reconstructing the power structure through an analytical framework of ‘announcement authority = real authority.’ To the author’s knowledge, this analysis has not been performed by conventional media in either the English-language or Japanese-language spheres.

2. Analytical Framework — Why ‘Announcement Authority’ Maps ‘Real Authority’

Power in emergencies appears in places different from the peacetime organisational chart. The person who first appears on television after a coup or assassination gains advantage in the ensuing power struggle — this is a commonplace of political science. Announcements have three dimensions.

First, what is announced (content). A factual declaration that ‘the council has been formed,’ an expression of intent to ‘retaliate,’ and a message of domestic control that ‘the nation will never forgive’ — each belongs to a different power domain.

Second, who announces (agent). It is natural for council members to announce their own formation. However, if a person who is NOT a council member begins explaining the council’s procedures, that is an anomalous signal indicating the location of ‘coordinating power.’

Third, through which outlet (channel). State TV (IRIB) live broadcast, video messages, Telegram, domestic news sites — channel choice indicates which audience the speaker is addressing. When the IRGC declares ‘the most ferocious offensive in history’ via Telegram, this is language of internal mobilisation and external deterrence, not language directed at citizens, operating in a separate system from the council’s ‘procedural language.’

This chapter traces the intersection of these three dimensions — content × agent × channel — to reconstruct the post-decapitation power structure.

3. Persian-Language Primary Source Statement Corpus — March 1, 2026: Six Voices

The following extracts six statements/remarks confirmed as issued on March 1, 2026 (Iranian calendar: Esfand 10, 1404), word-for-word from Persian-language primary sources, read through the lens of power analysis.

Table 4-1: Distribution of ‘Announcement Authority’ Reconstructed from Persian Primary Sources (March 1, 2026)

Speaker	Outlet	Statement (Persian original + translation)	Power Analysis: What This Announcement Means
President Pezeshkian	Khabaronline (video message)	شورای موقت رهبری کار خود را آغاز کرده است (‘The interim leadership council has begun its work’) [4-02]	The President carries the ‘narrative’ of formal state continuity. Content is factual declaration that ‘the council has started’ — neither war direction nor retaliation orders. The President functions as the ‘constitutional face.’
SNSC Sec-Gen Larijani	Jamaran (near-verbatim TV transcript)	طبق قانون اساسی… در اصل 111… شورای موقت رهبری تشکیل می‌شود (‘Under the constitution, per Article 111, an interim leadership council is formed’) [4-03]	[MOST CRITICAL] Larijani is NOT a member of the interim council. Yet he is explaining the council’s ‘constitutional basis,’ ‘composition,’ and ‘formation date.’ A person outside the council running the council’s procedures — the clearest sign that the emergency integration hub has shifted to the SNSC.
Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei	Fararu (condolence full text) / Eghtesadnews (IRIB live quote)	ملت… هرگز… نخواهد گذشت (‘The nation will never forgive’) [4-04]. شورای موقت رهبری تشکیل شد… (‘The interim council has been formed and will perform at its best’) [4-05]	Two different messages through two outlets. Religious citation + hardline condemnation as ‘disciplinary language’ in Fararu; factual confirmation of ‘council formed’ via IRIB quote in Eghtesadnews. The judiciary is not carrying ‘law enforcement’ but ‘legitimizing domestic control.’
Guardian Council Jurist Arafi	Khabaronline (Expediency Council spokesperson announcement)	Expediency Council spokesperson announced Arafi’s selection [4-06]	Critically, the announcement came not from Arafi himself but from the Expediency Council. This shows that the ‘announcement authority’ for confirming council membership lies with the Expediency side.
IRGC	Telegram (cited by DW)	‘The most ferocious offensive operation in history will begin shortly’ [4-07]	Completely separate system from the council’s ‘procedural language.’ The operational entity is conducting mobilisation at its own tempo. Dualization of the state’s voice.
Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf	State TV (cited by DW)	‘We had prepared for every scenario.’ ‘The US and Israel will pay the price.’ [4-07]	The highest-ranking politician to appear before cameras after the assassination. Parliament functioning not as ‘representative of the people’ but as a ‘political messageing device for mobilisation and control.’

4. The Larijani ‘Anomaly’ — The Man Running the Council from Outside

The most noteworthy entry in Table 4-1 is Larijani’s row. Ali Larijani is NOT a member of the interim leadership council. The council comprises President Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei, and Guardian Council Jurist Arafi [4-01]. Larijani’s title is Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the person who coordinates the practical work of nuclear negotiations, regional diplomacy, and domestic suppression [4-08].

Yet in the first hours after Khamenei’s death, it was Larijani who cited Article 111’s article number, explained the council’s composition, and went so far as to state ‘it will be formed today’ [4-03]. Reuters described Larijani as a ‘power broker’ and reported that ‘in Khamenei’s absence, the pragmatist Larijani is emerging’ [4-08].

What does this ‘anomaly’ mean? Three readings are possible.

The first reading: the SNSC has become the de facto central command post in the emergency. In peacetime, the SNSC is a coordinating body, but when the Supreme Leader + Chief of Staff + Defence Minister + Security Hub all vanish simultaneously, the SNSC emerges as the only integration hub spanning nuclear, diplomatic, and security domains. Larijani ‘standing in’ for the council’s procedural explanation is consistent with this structural consequence [4-08].

The second reading: Larijani’s personal political ambition. Larijani comes from a prominent political dynasty and has experience as Parliament Speaker. By positioning himself as the ‘explainer’ during the emergency, he can establish ‘coordinating power’ as fait accompli regardless of formal authority.

The third reading: a buffer in the power balance with the IRGC. Al Jazeera wrote that ‘the IRGC and Larijani may play important roles, but the balance of power is unknown’ [4-01]. Between the ‘military government’ scenario where the IRGC directly seizes political control and the ‘constitutional continuity’ scenario where the council formally governs, Larijani enters as coordinator — this ‘buffer’ structure is the most stable transition format for the regime.

The most structurally consistent reading from open sources is a combination of the first and third. The SNSC is emerging as the emergency integration hub, and its Secretary-General Larijani is functioning as ‘coordinator’ between the IRGC and the council. This is not a coup but a pragmatic power consolidation under conditions where ‘everyone is weak.’

5. Three Languages Running in Parallel — The Split of ‘Legitimacy,’ ‘Operations,’ and ‘Discipline’

Table 4-2: The Parallel Structure of ‘Three Languages’ in Post-Decapitation Iran

Language Type	Carrier	Representative Statement	Structural Meaning
Language of Legitimacy (constitutional, procedural)	President Pezeshkian, Guardian Council Jurist Arafi	‘The council has begun work.’ ‘Three-member body under Art. 111.’	Formal declaration that ‘the state continues.’ Presents ‘no vacuum’ domestically and internationally. But this language alone cannot justify military action or direct domestic suppression.
Language of Operations (mobilisation, retaliation)	IRGC (Telegram), Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf	‘The most ferocious offensive in history.’ ‘Every scenario prepared.’	Completely separate system from the council’s procedural language. The operational entity conducts internal mobilisation and external deterrence at its own tempo. No evidence the council’s ‘approval’ intervened here.
Language of Discipline (domestic control, religious legitimacy)	Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei	‘The nation will never forgive.’ ‘Will perform at its best.’	Religious citation + hardline condemnation combination. The ‘law enforcement’ organ legitimizes domestic control. This greatly exceeds the peacetime function of the judiciary.

When Khamenei was alive, all three languages converged in one person. Legitimacy flowed from Khamenei’s religious authority, operational orders issued from his authority as Supreme Commander, and domestic control was grounded in loyalty to Khamenei. One person integrated all three languages.

Now that person is gone, three languages are issued from separate entities and are not integrated. The IRGC’s ‘operational language’ shows no trace of the council’s ‘approval.’ The judiciary’s ‘disciplinary language’ is transmitted at a different temperature from the council’s ‘legitimacy language.’ And the function that is binding these three — not through institutional authority but practically — is SNSC Secretary-General Larijani.

6. Ghalibaf — What ‘The Highest-Ranking Politician Before the Cameras’ Reveals

One announcement that must not be overlooked: Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was reported by DW as ‘the highest-ranking politician’ to appear before state TV cameras after the assassination [4-07]. His statement — ‘we had prepared for every scenario,’ ‘the US and Israel will pay the price’ — is not the language of a ‘representative of the people.’ This is the language of a ‘mobilisation device.’

Parliament appearing not as a ‘legislative body’ deliberating law but as a ‘messageing device for controlling the citizenry during regime crisis’ — this is a signal of political front rigidification. Not debate but mobilisation; not deliberation but the language of obedience emanates from parliament.

7. Interim Polycentric Structure — The Dynamics of a State Without ‘One Supreme Leader’

Table 4-3: Polycentric Power Structure After Decapitation (Observation-Based)

Power Centre	Carrier	Language Used	Structural Implication
Formal Supreme Authority (constitutional face)	Interim Leadership Council (Pezeshkian / Mohseni-Ejei / Arafi)	Language of legitimacy	Presents formal state continuity. But how ‘consensus’ among the three is formed is opaque. Three share functions that Khamenei alone integrated, but veto power distribution is undefined.
Security Practical Integration (emergency hub)	SNSC’s Larijani	Language of procedure + coordination	Runs council procedures from outside the council. Cross-cutting coordination of nuclear, domestic suppression, and external security can only be done by the SNSC, creating structural necessity for centralization during emergencies [4-08].
Hard Power (operations, retaliation on the ground)	IRGC (new commander Vahidi)	Language of operations	Issues statements at its own tempo on Telegram without visible council ‘approval.’ Whether IRGC is subordinate to or parallel with the council — this question remains unanswered.
Political Mobilisation Front	Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf	Language of mobilisation	‘Every scenario prepared’ — the legislature functioning as a crisis mobilisation device. Language of obedience, not debate, emanates from parliament: a signal of rigidification.

8. The Hard Power Behind ‘Announcement Authority’ — The Full Picture of Military, Security, and Intelligence Organs

The analysis so far has traced the ‘surface’ of power — ‘who said what.’ But without examining the ‘reverse’ — the hard power organs that back up the announcements — the power structure analysis is only half complete. Iran’s regime, unlike an ordinary state, possesses a dual structure where two armies coexist in parallel: the regular military (Artesh) and the IRGC.  In addition, law enforcement (FARAJA/LEC), the Intelligence Ministry, and the Basij Mobilisation Force form a multi-layered domestic security structure.

Table 4-A: Iran’s Military, Security, and Intelligence Organs — ‘Two Armies’ and Multi-Layered Security

Organ	Scale	Primary Function	Notes
Regular Military (Artesh)	~350,000 (army/navy/air/air defence)	External defence, homeland defence	Army (NEZAJA), Navy (IRIN), Air Force (IRIAF), Air Defence Force (PADAJA). Mixed legacy Western (F-14, F-4) and Eastern equipment. Integrated under Chief of General Staff (Mousavi = killed). Artesh-IRGC operational integration was managed by this position.
IRGC (Revolutionary Guards)	~190,000 (+ Basij hundreds of thousands)	Regime defence, external military operations, domestic security of last resort	Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF = ballistic missiles/drones/space), Quds Force (external ops), Basij (mobilisation). Commander (Pakpour = killed). Successor Vahidi appointed. IRGC is ‘the regime’s shield,’ spanning both military and political roles.
IRGC-ASF (Aerospace Force)	(within IRGC)	Ballistic missiles, drones, space assets	Development, deployment, and operation of ballistic missiles (Shahab/Emad/Sejjil) and UAVs (Shahed/Ababil). The ‘inventory 60%, launch capability 25%’ examined in Ch. 7 pertains to this organisation. Underground base network.
Basij (Mobilisation Force)	Hundreds of thousands to ~1 million (when mobilised)	Para-military reinforcement for domestic security	Under IRGC. Street intimidation, frontline deployment for protest suppression. Deployed in 2022 Mahsa Amini protests and December 2025 protests. ‘Regime’s capillary penetration’ function.
FARAJA/LEC (National Police)	~Hundreds of thousands	Frontline street security response	Law Enforcement Command. First response, riot police, tear gas, detention. Lethal force in certain situations. Contains LEC Intelligence Organisation. Commander: Radan.
Intelligence Ministry (MOIS)	(classified)	Domestic surveillance, foreign intelligence	Detection, detention, foreign operations against dissidents. 10 command centres targeted in the attack [4-14].
Communications Ministry (MICT)	—	Internet shutdown operations	Executive body for nationwide internet blackouts. Implemented full shutdown Dec 2025–Jan 2026 [4-15].

The most critical structure is the division of labour where the regular military (Artesh) handles external defence while the IRGC handles regime defence. The ‘horizontal integration’ that Chief of General Staff Mousavi managed — operational coordination spanning both — was severed by Mousavi’s death (Chapter 5). However, each organisation’s ‘vertical command’ persists, explaining the reality of a regime that is ‘broken but not stopped.’

9. The Multi-Layered Structure of Domestic Suppression — Why Were the Dec 2025–Jan 2026 Protests Suppressed?

From December 2025 to January 2026, large-scale anti-government protests erupted across Iran. CTP-ISW daily updates reported protests spanning multiple provinces with fatalities from clashes with security forces [4-16]. Amnesty described the use of live ammunition as ‘massacre’ and reported deaths in the hundreds [4-17]. Yet the regime suppressed these protests. Why?

The answer: ‘The security apparatus functioned multi-layered and no defections occurred.’ Suppression was executed in five sequential stages under SNSC integrated command.

Table 4-B: Dec 2025–Jan 2026 Protest Suppression — Five-Stage Multi-Layer Package

#	Stage	Content	Structural Implication
①	SNSC Integrated Command Establishment (Layer 0)	SNSC sets ‘suppression as top priority’ policy. CTP-ISW references SNSC activity on Jan 9 [4-16].	SNSC sets the ‘rules’ for the national crisis, providing each agency with boundaries of ‘how far you may go.’ Larijani exercises coordinating power as Secretary-General (this chapter Sec. 4).
②	Nationwide Internet Shutdown (Layer 1)	Communications Ministry (MICT) implements nationwide internet blackout. VPN/Starlink alternatives also jammed/confiscated [4-15].	Simultaneously severs protest coordination means and international visibility. ‘Invisible protests don’t spread’ — the logic of communications shutdown.
③	FARAJA + Basij + Plainclothes Agent Street Deployment (Layer 2)	National Police (FARAJA) riot units for first response with tear gas/detention. Basij as paramilitary reinforcement. Plainclothes agents for identification/abduction-style detention [4-17][4-18].	IranWire reported this multi-layer structure in detail as ‘architecture of suppression’ [4-18]. Amnesty confirmed live ammunition use.
④	IRGC Ground Force Deployment (Layer 3)	IRGC ground forces deployed when ‘police cannot contain.’ Particularly visible in western regions (Kurdish areas etc.) [4-16].	IRGC ground forces are ‘the last resort of regime defence.’ Their deployment is a clear signal of ‘will to suppress.’
⑤	Curfews + Mass Arrests (Layer 4)	Post-massacre curfews, heavily-armed patrols, checkpoints. Mass detention of activists, students, minorities, lawyers, journalists [4-17].	‘Pull the shoots of rekindling in advance.’ Construct an environment where large gatherings physically cannot form.

These five stages functioning simultaneously as a ‘multi-layer package’ maintained the regime, as in the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Suppression success depended not on ‘regime strength’ but on ‘the security apparatus not defecting.’ IRGC soldiers, Basij mobilisation personnel, and FARAJA police all continued obeying orders. This ‘no defection’ is the precondition for the entire suppression mechanism.

10. What Parts of the Suppression Apparatus Did the Attack Target? — Systematic Destruction of the Security Apparatus

Reconstructing the target list from ISW/CTP battle reports after February 28, 2026, a striking feature emerges. The attacks targeted not only military facilities (missile bases, air defence, navy) but systematically targeted the security and intelligence organs responsible for domestic suppression [4-14][4-19].

Table 4-C: Security/Intelligence Organs Targeted by the Attack — Destroying ‘the Suppression Apparatus Itself’

Target	ISW/CTP Report	Structural Implication
LEC/FARAJA (National Police) Bases/HQ	Kurdish region LEC HQ (Sanandaj, Marivan), Tehran LEC Intelligence Organisation HQ [4-14][4-19]	Direct destruction of frontline suppression command systems and intelligence collection capability. Delays mobilisation if protests rekindle.
Basij Bases	Multiple Basij bases included in attack targets [4-19]	Physical destruction of street intimidation/mobilisation hubs. Degrades Basij’s regional penetration capability.
Intelligence Ministry (MOIS) Command Centres	10 Intelligence Ministry command centres targeted [4-14]	Destruction of the core capability for surveillance and detection of dissidents. Degrades the ability to ‘pull shoots of rekindling.’
IRIB (State Broadcasting) HQ	IRIB HQ attacked in Tehran [4-19]	Destruction of regime propaganda and information control capability. ‘Silencing the regime’s voice.’
SNSC / Presidential Palace / Assembly of Experts Facilities	Tehran political centre facilities attacked on 3/3 [4-19]	Physical destruction of the premises of the ‘rule-setter’ (Layer 0) of suppression.

ISW/CTP explicitly noted on March 2 that attack targets included ‘internal security sites responsible for maintaining security, suppressing protests’ [4-14]. This is not incidental collateral damage. The very apparatus that suppressed the protests is being systematically destroyed as attack targets.

The design philosophy examined in Chapter 2 — ‘weaken the regime right after suppression, while anger hasn’t cooled, to promote autonomous change’ — takes physical form here. The bases and headquarters of FARAJA, Basij, and the Intelligence Ministry that suppressed the January protests are destroyed by airstrikes. When protests rekindle, the regime cannot replicate the same multi-layer package. Each layer of Table 4-B (Five Stages of Suppression) is systematically destroyed in Table 4-C (Attack Target List) — this is the concrete mechanism of the design to promote ‘autonomous regime change.’

11. What Military/Security Structure Destruction Means for the ‘Announcement Authority’ Structure

Overlaying the ‘announcement authority’ structure analysed in Sections 1–7 with the military/security structure analysed in Sections 8–10, the power situation in post-decapitation Iran becomes three-dimensional.

The ‘announcement authority’ analysis showed a ‘polycentric structure’ where the language of legitimacy (council), operations (IRGC), and discipline (judiciary) run in parallel without integration. The military/security structure analysis shows that the hard power organs that physically supported this polycentric structure have been systematically degraded.

Even if the council announces ‘legitimacy,’ without a functioning security apparatus to enforce it on the populace, legitimacy lacks effective power. Even if the IRGC announces ‘operations,’ with launch capability at 25%, retaliation sustainability is limited. Even if the judiciary announces ‘discipline,’ with LEC headquarters and Basij bases destroyed, street suppression capability is degraded.

The ‘polycentric structure’ is fragmentation at the level of language; security apparatus degradation is weakening at the physical level. When these two overlap — language is fragmented AND the hard power backing it is degraded — this becomes the most fertile soil for the ‘autonomous regime change’ discussed in Chapter 2.

12. The ‘Precariousness’ of This Structure — Three Instabilities

The polycentric structure appears at first glance to be ‘a functioning regime.’ The council is formed, the IRGC continues operations, parliament issues mobilisation messages. However, at least three instabilities can be reverse-engineered from the broadcast analysis.

The first instability: the ‘language of legitimacy’ and the ‘language of operations’ are not integrated [4-01][4-07]. When the IRGC declares ‘the most ferocious offensive in history,’ there is no trace of referencing the council’s ‘approval.’ This means it is unclear whether the IRGC is acting under the council’s authority or as an independent parallel authority. Under Khamenei, IRGC actions were attributed to Khamenei’s command authority. That attribution point is now vacant.

The second instability: it is ambiguous whose hands hold the ‘horizontal bar’ (integrated coordination) [4-09]. As IranWire pointed out, the essence of this decapitation is not ‘loss of the top’ but ‘severance of integrated coordination across regular military × IRGC × government.’ The death of Chief of General Staff Mousavi is precisely this loss of the horizontal bar. Larijani’s SNSC appears to be substituting for this bar, but its institutional basis is thin.

The third instability: the risk inherent in Larijani’s prominence itself. Larijani consolidating coordinating power through the SNSC is a short-term stabilising factor for the regime. But if resentment within the IRGC emerges — ‘why is a non-military person running the security centre?’ — the polycentric structure can transform into internal conflict. Reuters’ characterization of Larijani as a ‘power broker’ describes a position that is simultaneously coordinator and target [4-08].

13. What ‘Announcement Authority = Real Authority’ Reveals: The True Face of Post-Decapitation Iran

English media’s ‘interim council has been formed’ is factually accurate but analytically empty. Only by tracing Persian-language primary sources word by word does the reality of power become visible.

Pezeshkian carries the ‘constitutional face’ but does not direct the war. Mohseni-Ejei carries ‘discipline’ but does not issue operational orders. The IRGC broadcasts ‘operational language’ at its own tempo with opaque relationship to the council. And Larijani — a person who is NOT a council member — cites Article 111’s article number, declares the council’s formation date, and issues warnings against separatism.

The structure this distribution reveals is a polycentric structure where the three languages (legitimacy, operations, discipline) that one Supreme Leader integrated have fragmented, with no institutional mechanism for reintegration. Larijani’s SNSC is functioning as a practical integration hub, but this is power consolidation based not on institutional authority but on emergency reality, with no guarantee of stability.

The most important conclusion from the ‘announcement authority = real authority’ analysis is that Iran’s regime has neither ‘collapsed’ nor ‘continued’ but is ‘moving while fragmented.’ Whether this fragmentation tends toward integration or develops into internal conflict is the observation point going forward. There is no method for that observation other than continuous tracking of Persian-language primary sources.

Chapter 5 examines the full picture of the ‘decapitation.’ Beyond IRGC command succession and Vahidi’s pre-positioning, it analyses the ‘multi-front simultaneous destruction’ design across the seven priority attack domains (command centres, internal security, missiles, air defence, navy, nuclear, propaganda), the five-function attrition assessment of the suppression apparatus analysed in this chapter, the organisational elimination of 16+ confirmed dead, and the determination of ‘sufficient conditions for revolution’ — examining what ‘decapitation’ brought to Iran’s overall national functions.

Chapter 4 — References

[4-01] Al Jazeera, “Iran to Form Interim Council to Oversee Transition After Khamenei’s Killing,” aljazeera.com (interim council formation, IRGC-Larijani roles, balance of power unknown)  [Link]

[4-02] Khabaronline (Persian), Pezeshkian video message, khabaronline.ir (‘Interim leadership council has begun its work’ original)  [Link]

[4-03] Jamaran (Persian), Larijani TV interview transcript, jamaran.news (Article 111 citation, ‘today the council will be formed’ original)  [Link]

[4-04] Fararu (Persian), Mohseni-Ejei condolence message full text, fararu.com (‘The nation will never forgive’ original)  [Link]

[4-05] Eghtesadnews (Persian), Mohseni-Ejei IRIB live broadcast quote, eghtesadnews.com (‘Council formed, will perform at its best’ original)  [Link]

[4-06] Khabaronline (Persian), Expediency Council spokesperson announcement of Arafi’s selection, khabaronline.ir  [Link]

[4-07] DW, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei Is Dead, State Media Confirms,” dw.com (IRGC Telegram statement ‘most ferocious offensive,’ Ghalibaf state TV appearance)  [Link]

[4-08] Reuters, “In Khamenei’s Absence, Pragmatist Larijani Emerges as Power Broker in Iran,” reuters.com (Larijani = power broker, SNSC as integration hub, separatism warning)  [Link]

[4-09] IranWire, “Iran Confirms Deaths of Top Military Leaders in US-Israeli Strikes,” iranwire.com (‘near-complete decapitation,’ Artesh-IRGC integrated coordination severed)  [Link]

[4-10] Reuters, “Alireza Arafi Appointed to Iran’s Leadership Council, ISNA Reports,” reuters.com  [Link]

[4-11] Iran International, “Pezeshkian: Interim Leadership Council Has Started Work,” iranintl.com  [Link]

[4-12] The Hindu, “Iran President Pezeshkian Address on Khamenei Killing,” thehindu.com (‘declaration of war on Muslims,’ ‘retaliation is right and duty’)  [Link]

[4-13] PressTV, “General Ahmad Vahidi Appointed Deputy Commander of IRGC,” presstv.ir (Dec 2025 pre-assassination Vahidi deputy appointment = pre-positioning)  [Link]

[4-14] ISW/CTP, Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 2, 2026 (‘internal security sites responsible for maintaining security, suppressing protests,’ 10 MOIS command centres, LEC/Basij bases targeted)  [Link]

[4-15] Wikipedia, “2026 Internet Blackout in Iran” (nationwide internet shutdown, MICT, Starlink jamming/confiscation)  [Link]

[4-16] CTP-ISW, Iran Update, January 9/25, 2026 (SNSC activity, IRGC ground force deployment, western region suppression)  [Link]

[4-17] Amnesty International, “What Happened at the Protests in Iran,” 2026/01 (live ammunition, massacre, curfews, mass detention) 

[4-18] IranWire, “Explainer: The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Architecture of Suppression” (FARAJA/Basij/plainclothes multi-layer structure)  [Link]

[4-19] ISW/CTP, Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 3, 2026 (Tehran political centre attacks, LEC Intelligence HQ, IRIB HQ)  [Link]